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ABSTRACT
Since the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949,
American military strategy, foreign policy, and naval presence in East Asia,
have all had a significant effect on the evolution of China's naval
development, strategy, and maritime doctrine. This thesis will explore the
roles, direct and indirect, the United States has played in the development of
China's maritime doctrine. China is quickly becoming a regional maritime
power and will continue to be a significant factor in the strategic equation of
the Western Pacific. The commonly held perception, that China is primarily
a continental power, is no longer true as the Chinese navy and merchant
marine fleet are today among the largest in the world. As China's national
interests expand beyond the Asia-Pacific region, understanding the natural
maritime component of those interests will be necessary in the evaluation of
China's global aspirations and national strength. This research will be
relevant in the assessment of China's maritime doctrine in the 1990s and will
allow planners of the Asia-Pacific region to better understand China's often
pragmatic approach to naval development and strategy. It will be up to the
planners and strategists alike to build on this study and make their own
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
China is the world's most populous country with emerging military and
economic muscle that will make it a critical player in the international
strategic balance. Perhaps because of its lack of seagoing tradition and
historical naval weakness, the realization of China as a maritime power has
not yet received the attention it deserves. The United States, as the world's
only remaining superpower, stands to greatly impact the outcome of China's
naval development in the future as it has in the past.
It is important to understand that China has had an impressive
maritime history beginning with the voyages of Zheng Hu in the 15th
century. Needless to say, the American factor had absolutely nothing to do
with this earliest stage of Chinese naval history. The first American
influences began to appear later with China's earliest confrontation with the
ships of the West in the nineteenth century.
Between 1842 and 1949 China's naval incompetence resulted in the
"barbarian" penetration from the sea. In large part due to its naval weakness,
China was forced to acquiesce to Western demands to open trade ports. By
1949, with the fall of China, the end of Nationalist control over the mainland
led to the formal establishment of Communist China (The People's Republic
of China), and the People's Liberation Army/Navy (PLAN). All of the
American sympathy, advise, and aid, went with the Nationalists to their new
location on Formosa. The "American factor" would prove to have had an
overwhelming impact on the development of the PRC's naval and maritime
doctrines.
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Between 1949 and 1953 the PRC's attitude became one of total opposition
to the United States. The American factor in the form of assistance to the
Republic of China (ROC), the US Seventh Fleet's presence in the Taiwan
Strait, strong American anti-communist rhetoric, and finally, the US
participation and overwhelming success in the Korean War, all contributed
to China's feeling of opposition to, if not hatred for, the United States.
With the last years of Mao Zedong, and the re-establishment of relations
with the United States, the American factor brought about an entirely new
stage in Chinese naval development. However, China's continuous fear of
being "encircled by imperialists" was heightened during this period by the
escalation of US military action in Vietnam and the build up of Soviet forces
along the Sino-Soviet land border. After China normalized relations with
the United States, the PRC Navy began to take up its natural role in the Asia-
Pacific by becoming the strongest tool in support of China's foreign policy. It
was the reassessment of the American factor - the zigs and zags in relations
with the United States - that would greatly influence the exponential growth
in the strength of China's drive toward a blue water navy.
By far the most important event of the period from 1976-1989 was the
establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and the US in
January 1979. The accomplishment and deficiencies of the PRC Navy, the
onset of US-PRC strategic cooperation, and China's economic reforms, each
contained a natural maritime component that was strongly influenced by the
American factor and had a significant impact on China's naval development
and maritime doctrine.
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Changes in the internaticnal environment in the late 1980s and early
1990s, only intensified the impact of China's domestic crisis on Sino-
American relations. The collapse of communism, first in Eastern Europe and
then in the Soviet Union, only stood to reinforce the American tendency to
perceive Beijing as a ruthless government. The collapse of communism
intensified Chinese concerns about the future of their relationship with the
United States.
As the Cold War gave way to a complex and evolving new world order,
the Chinese felt obliged to deal continuously with the American factor. It was
always the United States they perceived as their ultimate threat, and forced
them to spend as much as they did in building their credible fleet. They could
never consider entering any agreement on arms control - especially
involving the navy - without weighing the capabilities and policies of the
United States.
While China's navy is very much in transition and remains
predominately a coastal fleet, most East Asians still want an American
military presence to remain deployed in the region as insurance against the
uncertainties of the late 1990,s. In general it is safe to say that the risk of naval
conflict in the region is quite low for now, however, latent security fears still
exist. China remains determined to see to "t that its historical territorial
waters remain under its control. The American factor has been and will




Since the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949,
American military strategy, foreign policy, and naval presence in East Asia,
have all had a significant effect on the evolution of China's naval
development, strategy, and maritime doctrine. This thesis will explore the
roles, direct and indirect, the United States has played in the development of
China's maritime doctrine.
China is quickly becoming a regional maritime power and will
continue to be a significant factor in the strategic equation of the Western
Pacific. The commonly held perception, that the PRC is primarily a
continental power, is no longer true as the Chinese navy and merchant
marine fleet are today among the largest in the world.* As China's national
interests expand beyond the Asia-Pacific region, understanding the natural
maritime component of those interests will be necessary in the evaluation of
China's global aspirations and national strength.
After a two-part introduction on China's maritime and naval history
focusing from 907-1842, and on foreign imperialism from 1842-1949, this
historical analysis will be broken down into six major periods beginning in
1949 with the emergence of Communist China. The six distinct periods will
be characterized by the changes in US - PRC relations from 1949-1993. Each
segment will assess the strength of the "American factor" and its influence on
* At the time of this study (late 1993). the growing Chinese Navy is the world's third
largest naval fleet and the Chinese merchant marine is currently ranked fourth in total number
of ships. [1993 Maritime Administration Report]
each significant change in China's maritime doctrine and naval
development.
This research will be relevant in the assessment of China's maritime
doctrine in the 1990s and will allow planners of the Asia-Pacific region to
better understand China's often pragmatic approach to naval development
and strategy. In each of the six periods, the "American factor" will be
discussed and shown to have had a significant impact on China's evolving
maritime policy. It is inevitable that the policy maker will wonder when the
sixth period (1993 and beyond) will end and what the characteristics of the
period that follows might be It will be up to the planners and strategists alike
to build on this study and make their own interpretations and applications to
policy-making as the future unfolds.
A. CHINA'S MARITIME AND NAVAL HISTORY (907-1842)
China's maritime epoch began sometime in the early eighth century. It
was around this time that pressures on China's internal population caused an
extensive migration of people away from the north, down the Yangzi River
to the sea, and southward alhng the coast.*
The evolution of maritime China took a big leap forward sometime
around the fall of the Tang dynasty in 907 A.D. During the four dynasties that
followed - the Song (960-1279 A.D.), the Yuan or Mongol (1279-1368 A.D.), the
Ming (1368-1644 A.D.), and the Qing (1644-1912 A.D.) - sea travel, ocean trade,
* Virtually all of this intrductin, China's Maritime and Naval History (907-1949),
relies heavily on Bruce Swanson's, Eighth Voyage Of The Dragon. I have attempted to cover
over 1,000 years of naval and maritime history, up to the founding of The People's Republic of
China, in as few pages as possible while giving justice to those matters which will be pertinent
later in this text. Any information which could be considered as historical fact has generally
been left uncited. Where Swanson', opinions or analysis are used in this study, of course, the
appropriate citation is referenced.
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and the introduction of foreign ideas (not to mention foreign "imperialism"),
all made their own distinct contributions to China's naval thinking.
In 1127 A.D., the ruling dynasty, the Song, was forced to flee the inland
capital at Kaifeng, because of warfare in the north with the Han Chinese, and
reestablish its rule south of the Yangzi River Valley. The new capital,
Hangzhou, a minor port city on the East China Sea, was where the Song set
about controlling the coast and the Yangzi River, as an economic and military
defense, against the rebellious nomads to the north. For the first time in
China's long history, the sea became a new frontier for those who dared to
conquer it.
It was during the early Ming period that seven awesome voyages
between 1405-1433 A.D. were authorized and Chinese seapower, though short
lived, began. Sea travel took the Chinese southward, into the Indian Ocean,
and on to the east coast of Africa. However, almost as quickly as it began, the
voyages were terminated.
The first Ming emperor (1368 A.D.), Hung-wu, had contact with many
men who had knowledge of the sea, but his primary concern was making
China's borders and cities safe from Mongol invasion. On the coast, Hung-
wu had to deal with problems of piracy by the Japanese and others. In
response, he ordered a halt to merchant shipping, declared sea travel and
going overseas illegal, and punished those who attempted such actions as
traitors with swift execution. Hung-wu also directed the undertaking of an
extensive canal system, which upon completion was to replace the pirate-
plagued sea routes.
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Hung-wu, in trying to reestablish the long accepted tributary system
under his rule, ordered sea-borne missions to the peripheral states, including
Japan, Korea, and Annam (Vietnam). These missions were sent to proclaim
that all who wished to enter into relations with China, the Middle Kingdom,
must first acknowledge the official position and power of the new emperor.
These missions also served to inform the new Chinese dynasty with
information on the situations in the border areas.
Tribute missions soon came in from these states, and from others to
which Mongol expeditions had been sent almost a century earlier, on the
established routes of China s overseas trade. The relationship between the
ruler of China and the rulers of other countries expressed the traditional
"culturalism" in which China was assumed to be not only the largest but the
oldest among the states, and indeed, the source of their civilization. This
tribute system was not seen as aggressive imperialism but rather, simply an
expression of culturalism. If foreign rulers wished relations, and if they
valued trade with China, they had to acknowledge the universal supremacy
of the "Son of Heaven," China's emperor. The size and number of Chinese
ships contributed to the awe with which the Middle Kingdom was regarded.
Tribute relations... also (had) many other aspects of interstate relations:
the exchange of envoys and conduct of diplomatic relations, repatriation
and extradition of persons, regulation of Sino-foreign trade, and special
Chinese efforts at self-defense through intimidating, cajoling, or
subsidizing foreign tribes and rulers. [Ref. 34, p 195]
In 1398, Hung-wu died and ultimately his fourth son, Chengzu, came
to power in 1403 naming his throne Yongle, meaning "perpetual happiness."
Yongle's ambition and leadership enabled him to work out a strategy that
gained respect for Chinese power and enriched the imperial treasuries. Also
4
in 1403, Yongle reopened merchant shipping and built hostels to house
tributary missions coming b'. sea. A system was devised whereby legitimate
merchants were given trading passports so that pirates could hence forth be
identified. This allowed the Chinese, Japanese, and other businessmen, to
carry on the lucrative business of trade to and from China's ports.
In 1405, during the reign of the Yongle emperor, a series of seven naval
expeditions into the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean provided
evidence that China was one of the world's supreme sea powers, with
shipbuilding techniques and navigational abilities that were unsurpassed by
any other nation. The aggressive shipbuilding effort that actually began in
1403, was responsible for tht construction of over 2,000 large seagoing vessels
during a period of the next 16 years. In addition to overseeing the building of
the Ming fleet, Yongle selected senior officers who were to lead the Chinese
expeditions. The man chosen to be the overall commander of the fleet was a
Muslim eunuch named Zheng He. Being a Muslim he was deemed well fit
to deal with the Islamic rulers of South Asia.
The sea routes used by the Ming naval captains had been in existence
since the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) and were divided into two major sea
lanes: the East Sea Route and the West Sea Route; each of which was
subdivided into a major and a minor route. The major East Sea Route, for
example, took the fleet to Java and southern Borneo, while the major West
Sea Route visited ports in Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, and was the
route taken to the Indian Ocean via the Straits of Malacca.*
* See map, following page: East/West Trade And Expeditionary Routes. [Ref. 17 p 46]
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The first naval expedition which got under way in 1405, included an
estimated 317 ships, and reached the shores of India, as did the second and
third expeditions. The family records of Zheng He best indicated the size of
these undertakings:
The men of the expedition included 7 imperial eunuchs as
ambassadors, 10 eunuchs as assistant ambassadors, 10 junior eunuchs, 53
eunuch chamberlains, 2 chief military directors, 93 military directors, one
senior secretary of the Revenue Ministry, 2 masters of ceremony or
protocol from the Honglusi (Department of State Ceremonials) for the
audience of foreign ambassadors, one master and 4 assistant geomancer
"meteorologists," 128 medical officers and assistants, 26,803 military,
braves, "regular" officers, soldiers, reservists, cooks, purveyors, and clerks -
in all 27,000 men. [Ref. 1, pp 37-38]
On the return voyage from India, the large military contingent played
an important role. When Zheng arrived and went ashore in Sumatra he
received reports of a pirate chieftain who had repeatedly robbed foreign
merchant ships. In a series of sea and land battles, the pirate forces lost 5,000
men, and Zheng captured the pirate leader and transported him back to China
where the emperor promptly had him executed.
Another example of Zheng's effective use of military force took place
on the fourth voyage, this time in northern Sumatra. Tribal leaders there
were fighting over whose king was the rightful ruler. Zheng interceded on
behalf of the king who had rendered tribute in previous years to earlier
expeditions. Zheng He's forces also saw combat during the third and fifth
expeditions where his "marines" fought several violent battles. Another
important duty of Zheng's was to bring back a wide variety of items to the
imperial court, some of which included: jewels (sapphires, rubies, and
7
diamonds); animals (lions and horses) and; exotic food (dates, almonds,
raisins, and apples).
... Overall, they (Zheng's expeditions) were highly successful diplomatic
missions whose size and sophistication created awe in foreign ports. It
should be stressed that they were not missions of conquest and plunder
but of commerce and trade. A special concern of the expeditions, in fact,
was the securing of the Malacca Strait through which valuable commerce
passed to and from China. [Ref. 17, p 42]
The world to date had never seen such a large, and successful,
undertaking of sea travel and masterful seaworthiness. These Chinese
armadas sailed the Indian Ocean to Africa almost a century before the
Portuguese (1498), and 150 years before the Spanish Armada (1588) sailed
around England. China's seagoing junks were over 400 feet long, had four
decks, up to 12 watertight compartments, and navigated by compass. The
typical number of permanent ships' company was about fifty, including a
compliment of approximately thirty marines.*
During the course ot the Ming expeditions several factors led to a
decrease in public interest in maritime affairs. In 1411 the Grand Canal which
had been damaged by flood and warfare years earlier was reopened. Why
transport tribute by sea when the Grand Canal was available? The center of
Chinese population shifted back inland, away from the coast. The continuing
Mongol raids along the northern land border demanded imperial attention.
Naval policy was a less attractive field of operation for corrupt government
bureaucrats, and finally, a new version of Confucianism, that was strongly
influenced by Buddhism, resulted in a loss of interest in geomancy and
maritime expansion.
"See picture, following page: Chinese Maritime Innovations. [Ref. 17, p 45]
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Source: Pacific Century, p 45
CHINESE MARITIME INNOVATIONS
Critical to the success of China as a maritime power and global trader were its innovations
in navigation and sailing. Among these were:
"* The magnetic compass, in use by 1119. was probably noticed by Arab traders
who subsequently introduced it to the Mediterranean world.
"* An early version of the sextant called the "dipper-observer" was used in
navigation along with the compass to track the Great Bear constellation.
"• China's shipbuilders produced the leeboard. the centerboard, the windlass, and
the watertight compartment, all of which were introduced by Arabs into the
West.
"* The dry dock- enabling extensive repair and maintenance of a great Song
fleet- did not appear in Europe until centuries later.
"* Warship construction included paddle-wheel ships, operated by treadmill, with
up to eleven wheels per ship.
"* Weather forecasting, primarily with respect to wind shifts, was based upon
seasonal and weather signs.
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It can be taken for granted that the basic reason for the absolute loss of
interest in the sea was the great cost of such ventures. Although the early
Ming emperors were not enamored with the idea of maritime expansion;
they were obliged to put aside any glamorous maritime overtures when the
imperial treasury was emptied by the expensive projects of defeating their
enemies and building for themselves the spectacular capital city of Beijing.
On the threshold of becoming a great naval power that might have
dominated the region, China's maritime interests faded at a time that directly
coincided with European maritime expansion into Asia. The Ming fleets
were quickly developing the capacity to bring military power and trade goods
to any point in the Eastern seas. But after 1433, the Ming court sustained no
interest in the possibilities ot attaining seapower.
These triumphs of imperial navigation seem in retrospect to suggest
that China might have been poised to become a great naval power that
would dominate all of maritime Asia, but such was not to be the case. (Ref.
17
, p 43 ]
The sudden rise and subsequent rapid decline of officially sanctioned
maritime activity during the Ming period exemplifies the overriding
continentalist belief that has had a hold on China until very recent times. As
the growing coastal population was attempting to use the sea to support its
needs, the government was discouraging such practices. The collapse of the
Ming empire in 1644 was brought about by the Manchus who had little
interest in naval or maritime matters.*
China's lack of interest in seapower might have had its origins in the
strategic concept of neiluan wailiuan ("inside disorder and outside calamity").
* See map, following page: China During The Ming Dynasty. [Ref. 17, p 44]
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Neiluan waihuan considered internal rebellion and foreign aggression
across the northern borders to be the two things that most threatened ruling
dynasties. In addition to the above literal translation, the Chinese had an
interpretation concerned with the strategy of defending against these dual
threats. It translates simply as "internal weakness invites invasion from
without." It is in this context that the Chinese concept of neiluan waihuan
closely resembles the modern idea of defensive strategic deterrence where;
potential enemies had to be convinced that Chinese military forces would
respond to aggression with "unacceptable counteraction." [Ref. 1, p 55]
This concept made for strong attitudes among the military forces.
Imperial naval strategists following these ideas pursued a policy of maritime
defense known as haifang (sea protection). The Chinese believed that the
best way to deal with the enemy who came by sea was to place naval defense
forces in and around key areas like, the river approaches, major harbors, and
the larger offshore islands. Thus making naval strategy defensive and coastal
in nature, not aggressive and ocean going. It was not until relatively recent
times that terms like "seapower" and "high-seas fleet" became common
vocabulary for Chinese military and naval strategists.
Probably the most significant weakness of China's imperial navies was
the lack of a central agency to handle the management of naval affairs.
Without a naval minister, members of high civil office were often appointed
to act on the emperor's behalf when a maritime crises arose. [Ref. 1, pp 56-57]
During China's first millennium, navies were river and canal defense forces.
In the Song period, riverine warfare was extended to the coastal region as the
Mongols pressed down from the north.
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In Ming and Manchu China, naval officers were of two distinct types:
idealistic senior commanders and career officers. The idealistic commanders
were usually appointed by the emperor during periods of crisis. The career
officer was either a "conformist," mildly corrupt and subordinate, or an
"opportunist," often manipulative yet energetic and ambitious. Neither type
had any extensive classical education but both sought rank and prestige. [Ref.
1, pp 62-63]
Needless to say the American factor had absolutely nothing to do with
this, the earliest stage of Chinese naval history. The first American
influences began to appear later with China's earliest confrontation with the
ships of the West in the nineteenth century.
B. NAVAL HISTORY & FOREIGN IMPERIALISM (1842-1949)
In spite of certain limited success, Chinese shipbuilding and naval
tactics were hopelessly antiquated and out-gunned when compared to the
British. By the end of the eighteenth century, after their defeat in the Opium
War, the Chinese were forced to sign a treaty aboard the British ship
Cornwallis anchored at Nanjing (29 August 1842). There was no American
participation in the first fights between the British and the "modern" Chinese
navy. The treaty was significant however, because it represented the first in a
series of "unequal treaties" that China would have to sign under the threat of
Western seapower. In large part due to its naval weakness, China lost the
Opium Wars and was forced to acquiesce to Western demands to open trade
ports. In the words of Bruce Swanson,
It became alarmingly evident that China's naval stagnation had
resulted in barbarian penetration from the sea. The ocean no longer
served as an extension of the Great Wall. [Ref. 1, p 72]
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Of course the Americans, through most favored nation, derived the
same advantages as the British in this newly created unequal treaty system.
Furthermore, the American naval presence was duly noted by the Chinese as
they negotiated their separate treaty with the Americans at Whampoa in
1849.*
Britain's defeat of China had led to an important shift in the attitude of
the emperor toward naval reform. He believed that if warships had to be
built along Western designs to be effective, and if they could not be built all at
once, they should be purchased. In 1861, after another disastrous war with the
British and the French, the Chinese planned to purchase eight steam driven
warships from Britain, which was cleariy the most advanced of the foreign
naval powers. The major flaw in this plan was that the British stipulated that
the squadron, and its commander in chief, be commanded by a European.
Needless to say, the Chinese refused this announcement and the warship
purchase was canceled. By this time, American-built clipper ships began to
make a deep impression on the Chinese.
In the summer of 1866, a five year contract with the French and English
called for the building of a shipyard and a naval academy. Sixteen ships were
to be constructed and a European staff was to be responsible for training
Chinese workers and midshipmen. The Fuzhou naval complex (shipyard
and academy) was divided into a French school and an English school. The
French taught naval construction, design and an apprentice school, while the
English taught theoretical navigation, practical navigation and engine-room
* The Chinese had their first taste of American naval power during the fighting in
north China. In the "Blood is thicker than water" incident, the American ships, though
neutral, took up positions decidedly favorable to the British.
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operations. In June of 1869, the Fuzhou shipyard launched its first ship, the
Wannianqing, a wooden sloop 68 meters in length with several 14-cm guns.
Over the next four years the shipyard built 11 more ships of various sizes,
including two gunboats, each 52 meters long, and the Fupo, a 1,258-ton
transport ship. These Chinese attempts at naval modernization was
considered a monumental achievement at the time. The Americans were
not yet in position to participate in the Chinese naval development schemes.
In 1874 the main threat to China was Japan, a neighbor with naval
potential. It was generally believed that if the Chinese were to catch up to the
rapidly modernizing Japanese, an extensive program of foreign naval
purchases would be necessary. Between 1875 and 1879, China received the
first of four iron gunboats from Britain. In addition to the naval purchase
program, China began to e\pand its recruitment of Western naval experts
(still no Americans) to train the navy, and in 1885, China at long last
established a central office to handle naval affairs.
Despite the establishment of the Navy Office, China's fleets remained
severely limited and disjointed, and had failed to create an effective naval
force. One factor was the $4 million naval budget, as it was an attractive target
for corrupt government officials. At the absolute apex of the imperial
corruption was the empress Dowager who, between 1889 and 1894, diverted
an estimated $12 million from the navy for a Summer Palace and a marble
boat. As testimony to the excesses of the late Manchu period, the marble boat
remains anchored at the bottom of a lake. The simple fact that the empress
was more concerned with the excesses of her court than the building of a
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navy, quite possibly contributed to the devastating defeat of the China in the
Sino-Japanese War. [Ref. 1, pp 97-99]
This late Ching naval effort was starved by the court, which decided
instead to build up the new Summer Palace northwest of Peking as a
retreat for the Empress Dowager on her retirement in 1889. The famous
marble barge in the big lake there epitomizes this story. [Ref. 34, p 622]
In September of 1894, afte: the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, while
the Chinese fleet was at anchor off the mouth of the Yalu River in the
northern Yellow Sea, Chinese crews spotted a large Japanese fleet heading
toward their anchored naval units. As the Chinese hurried to get underway,
the Japanese efficiently took up formation and prepared for battle. As the two
fleets closed each other, the Japanese patiently held their fire until they had
closed to about 3,000 yards. At this time, the Japanese opened fire from their
many rapid firing guns and shortly there after the entire Chinese fleet had
sustained serious damage. In the aftermath of this naval battle, the Chinese
crews sustained over 600 deaths, while the Japanese lost only 78 men. Every
Chinese ship had been damaged or sunk while the entire Japanese fleet
escaped sustaining only minimal damage. One post-action assessment (of the
naval battle at Yalu) by a US Navy observer reported that the Chinese lost the
battle largely due to their "(naval) incompetence." [Ref. 1, p 110]
When the Japanese navy unexpectedly defeated Li's Peiyang fleet off
the Yalu in September 1894, it upset the power balance both within China
and internationally. ...Japan's victory had worldwide repercussions and
inspired a rivalry among imperialist powers competing to expand at
China's expense. [Ref. 34, p 623]
As a result of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), and after the signing
of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in August of 1895, many Chinese believed that
the best way to insure coastal security was to give the task to Russia through a
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secret naval treaty. This proposal, which was denied by the emperor, is
noteworthy because 55 years later it would serve as the basis for Sino-Soviet
naval cooperation. There was still no record of the Chinese seeking help or
advice from the United States.
Following Japan's naval defeat of Russia at Tsushima in 1905, the
Chinese, impressed with Japan's victory, saw Japanese naval assistance to
China as a possible means to free themselves from European commercialism.
In 1907 and 1908, China began to conduct naval business with the Japanese
shipyard at Kawasaki when they accepted shipment of four torpedo boats.
At the same time, the Japanese were trying to build a controlling
position in China's plans for a new navy. By 1909 Japanese naval influence
had increased and in that year, eight Chinese naval officers were sent to the
Naval Gunnery School at Yokosuka. Furthermore, it was agreed that a select
number of Chinese midshipmen would be admitted annually to Japanese
naval schools. One complication with Japan's naval aid however, was that
Japan was interested in the discovery of phosphate deposits on several of the
islands in the South China Sea. These islands are now known as the Paracel
and Spratly Islands. In 1907 China sent a naval expedition to the disputed
islands to survey and reclaim them for the Chinese government. In 1910
China issued annexation announcements for each of the islands and in the
face of Chinese determination, the Japanese removed their men and
equipment. [Ref. 1, pp 120-123]
Foreign interest in the Chinese navy did not end with the Japanese, as
the British and, for the first time, the United States, were also aggressively
pursuing Chinese naval contracts. American naval capability and naval
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doctrine took on an entirely new dimension after Admiral Mahan and the
American acquisition of the Philippines. At last the Americans had a navy
that could put teeth in their determination to plunge deeper into the China
market.
In 1910, Chinese officials arrived in San Francisco for a two-week visit.
They met with President Taft and took tours of the United States Military
Academies at Annapolis and West Point. During the visit the Chinese
officials signed a contract with Bethlehem Steel. The contract included
money for Bethlehem Steel to improve existing gun and arsenal facilities;
construction of new port facilities and new shipyards and; money for both
ships and guns. On 9 February 1911, these plans were officially approved but
it was too late as China was in the beginning of a revolution during which
most of the warships, that had been acquired from the Japanese between 1907
and 1910, defected to the side of the revolutionaries.
In spite of fragmented loyalties in the aftermath of the revolution, the
Chinese navy retained some order and discipline. A promotional system
remained in effect throughout this period and even if an officer defected, he
maintained his rank and pay and was seldom punished if he later chose to
return. Perhaps because of this, the navy continued to place more importance
on position rather than rank. As a result, the position as a commanding
officer of a ship afloat was more highly prized and carried greater prestige
than that of a staff position.
The naval ship. inherited by the Republic between 1911 and 1912 were
small in number but not too outdated. These ships were divided among
three squadrons. The First 5quadron had four cruisers, all in good working
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order, while the Second Squadron contained mostly river gunboats which
were quite old and of little value. The Third Squadron was a training
squadron and had six of the newest ships from the United States (the Feiying),
Great Britain (the Chenghe and Yingrui) and Germany (three destroyers).
From 1912 to 1937, the rapidly changing world had survived World
War I, the Washington Naval Conference and the rapidly developing
confrontation of World War II. China maintained six naval schools and two
shipyards that often functioned quite effectively. Also during this period,
China was distinctly aware that the United States had potentially become the
strongest naval power in the world. Furthermore, China's diplomatic destiny
became hitched to the American star. While the revolution had successfully
thrown out the Manchus, the treaty countries remained and continued to
enjoy special privileges and the rights of extra-territoriality. The principal
foreign powers in China were, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, Japan, and of
course, the United States.
At this point, the naval connection between China and the United
States became more manifest. The principal American agent in China was
the US naval attach6, Commander Gillis. Gillis had been instrumental in the
Bethlehem contract (1911), and in 1912 he was sent to Beijing with
instructions to continue his assistance to American firms. In 1915, the
Chinese approached Gillis with a proposal for the United States to sponsor
Chinese officers to go to America to observe the manufacturing and operation
of US submarines. Gillis managed to arrange a visit for the Chinese to the
Electric Boat Company in Connecticut, and the US Navy Department began to
study the advantages of training the Chinese. In 1916, as the political
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situation in China deteriorated, those involved in the submarine plan lost
interest and the idea was canceled. China's participation in World War I did
not produce any significant effect on its naval development.
The Washington Conference (November 1921 - February 1922), among
other things, produced a series of settlements that had important maritime
implications for the Pacific. These included:
1. The Four Power Treaty which called for the abolishment of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
2. The Five Power Treaty. A naval agreement that limited capital ship
construction to a 55:3 ratio for Britain, the United States, and Japan.
Both America and Britain agreed to no further naval base
development east of Singapore or west of Hawaii.
3. The Japanese agreed to withdraw from Shandong and the northeast
Asian mainland.
4. A Nine-Power Treaty that recognized the "Open Door," and the
territorial and administrative integrity of China.
While on the surface these agreements seemed favorable for China,
they managed to all but destroy any Chinese hopes of acquiring US naval aid.
American attention had to be shifted elsewhere. In May 1922, US Secretary of
State, Charles Evans Hughes, stated that the United States had no intention of
honoring the Bethlehem contract or providing naval assistance to China. In
the words of then chief of Far Eastern Affairs, John Van Antwerp MacMurray,
this was because,
China was a country in turmoil and nearly bankrupt, and America had
no business lending millions of dollars to provide funds for the naval
clique to squander in playing for position with the strong military factions
(in China). [Ref. 1, p 151]
Commander Gillis reportedly responded that, with this action the US
had deprived itself of any and all opportunity to shape the Chinese Navy.
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Any attempt by the US Navy to involve itself in Chinese naval affairs had to
be postponed until after World War II. [Ref. 1, pp 151-152]
As World War II approached, hostilities with Japan and the
Communists prevented any plans of naval rebuilding. The Kuomintang
leader, Chiang K'ai-shek, did manage to recruit 1,000 men to form the
nucleus for a post-war navy. Both the British and the United States showed
interest in this activity. During this period, the United States maintained a
naval attachd in Beijing, conducted many port visits, and kept its river fleet
on the Yangzi to demonstrate its profound interest in Chinese naval
development.
After the war ended, British involvement in Chinese naval affairs
increased, and after Germany surrendered in Europe, the United States
approved the transfer of eight warships to China.* They included: two
destroyers, four minesweepers, and two patrol craft escorts. At the same time
the Chinese sent over 1,000 officers and enlisted men to the United States for
naval training, 25 of which went to Annapolis and 24 to Massachusetts
Institute of Technology for technical training.
FollOwing the Japanese surrender in August of 1945, the Nationalist
government signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in
Moscow after several weeks of meetings with Stalin and the Soviet Foreign
Minister. The treaty plecdged mutual respect for each country's sovereignties
and mutual noninterference in their internal affairs. From a naval
standpoint, the treaty committed China to declare Dalian and Port Arthur free
* Between 1945 and 1949, China received a total of 271 World War II surplus ships from
the United States. Britain and Canada provided another 15 ships and an additional 33 were
transferred from Japan as war reparations. [Ref. 2, p. 7]
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ports, "open to commerce and shipping of all nations." The American navy
had been too preoccupied with fighting Japan to pay too much attention to its
future with China. All the time, however, while hostilities raged at sea,
America kept its connections with Chungking intact by means of submarines
landing on the China coast. Full scale operations were conducted by SACO
(the Sino American Cooperative Organization) in spite of the watchful eyes of
the Japanese.
By late 1945, the Chinese Nationalists were increasingly preoccupied
with the advances being made by the Communist forces in the north. As a
result, the US Navy found itself a participant in an expanding civil war in
spite of the official American policy that, "...the United States will not support
the Central Government of China in a fratricidal war." [Ref. 1, p 1711
During this time virtually all Chinese naval operations were
conducted as seaward extensions of ground operations. Further
complications existed ashore at the Chinese Navy Headquarters as army
officers headed the Bureaus of Personnel, Supply, and Procurement. Afloat,
the problem of control was a considerable challenge as Nationalist ship after
ship was defecting to the Communist side.
Since the Americans were providing all military advice to Chiang Kai-
shek through an organization known as MAGIC (Military Advisory Group In
China) its naval component naturally recommended building a system along
American lines. They encouraged a situation in which the United States
would be the preeminent force in Asia after Japan was defeated. They pointed
out that the US naval system had proven itself to be superior to the Japanese
in the battles of World War II, and assumed that superiority would continue.
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As the Chinese Communists prevailed in the civil war, Chiang's naval
officers hoped that Sino-American naval cooperation would be forthcoming
to counter potential Soviet naval expansion in the Pacific. The Chinese were
all too aware that the Soviets, through the Yalta Agreement, took control
over the Kuriles° from Japan and had acquired privileges in Dalian and Port
Arthur from China.
As early as January 1947, in the major fighting that had erupted in
northern China between the Nationalists and the Communists, it was clear
that Communists were gaining the upper hand. As the pressures of warfare
increased inland, the ineffective Nationalists Navy was heavily engaged in
attempting to blockade shipping between the Liaodong and Shandong
peninsulas. The Nationalists were severely limited however, as the Soviets
refused to allow commercial shipping or Nationalist naval vessels to enter
Dalian. The Americans were astopped from transporting Nationalist troops
to Manchuria, which resulted in an American protest to the Soviet Union,
but to no avail as the Soviets insisted that Dalian remain closed and under
the administrative control of the Soviet government.
The aforementioned MAGIC, that had among its many duties to assist
the Chinese in modernizing its shipyards and to advise the Chinese on anti-
piracy and anti-smuggling operations, managed to bring about the transfer of
74 more ships to the Chinese fleet. These included: eight LSTs, six LSMs,
seven LCIs, three LCTs, 25 LCMs, and 25 LCVPs, all left over vessels from the
war in Europe (World War II). The U.S. decision was designed to prevent the
* The Kurile Islands were considered worth special attention as they stretch for 700
miles and Soviet possession of this island group made the Okhotsk Sea a "Soviet naval-lake".
This greatly elevated the Soviet position as they were no longer isolated from the Pacific.
23
Communists from conquering Formosa and to limit the expansion of Soviet
activities in northeast China.
The MAGIC at Nanjing also helped to create the Chinese Department
of Naval Affairs which was a mirror image of the US Navy Headquarters. In
addition to the earlier three squadrons of the Chinese navy, a fourth
squadron was established. This squadron was a Transport Squadron and was
responsible for shipping supplies to the three other squadrons of the Chinese
Navy.
In the midst of a collapsing government on the mainland, as
Nationalists ships and sailors alike were defecting to the Communist side,
Chiang K'ai-shek spent time aboard the cruiser Chongqing observing the
worsening military situation along the coast. As the military disasters
accumulated, the Nationalist retreat increased. In January 1949, Chiang K'ai-
shek retired as president of the Republic and within two weeks, Beijing fell to
the Communists. The Kuomintang government transferred itself from
Beijing to Canton, as the Communist Third Army built up along the
northern bank of the Yangzi River. Also during this period, the US Navy
Advisory Division and the Chinese naval units at Qingdao began to
withdraw to Taiwan and Xiamen. [Ref. 1, p 180] While all this was taking
place, the United States Navy was obliged to remain inactive.
In early April 1949, officers at the Chinese Navy Headquarters had at
long last realized that the lack of unity in their command structure would
cause even more ships to defect to the Communists. On 20 April 1949, the
Second Squadron* was ordered up the Yangzi river in an attempt to stop the
* There were four naval squadrons in the Chinese fleet, the Third Squadron was a
training fleet and the Fourth Squadron was a transport fleet designed for resupply.
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Communists from crossing The squadron was promised decoration and
financial reward if successful. Faced with possible annihilation in the face of
the overpowering Communist forces along the river, the entire squadron
defected, taking with it a total of 18 ships and over 1,200 trained sailors. One
destroyer, three destroyer escorts, one patrol gunboat, five landing craft, and
eight smaller auxiliaries, defected.
This horrendous action was the last use of Kuomintang naval forces in
the civil war except as a means to evacuate the Nationalist forces to Taiwan.
The end of Nationalist control over the mainland led to the formal
establishment of Communist China (The People's Republic of China), and
the People's Liberation Armv/Navy (PLAN). All of the American sympathy,
advise, and aid, went with the Nationalists to their new location on Formosa.
So far as mainland China - the PRC - was concerned, American loyalties,
influence, and presence, from this point on would be positive for Taiwan and
negative for the Communist regime. That "American factor" would have an
overwhelming impact on the development of the PRC's naval and maritime
doctrines.
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II. OPPOSITION TO THE UNITED STATES: 1949-1953
It is important to note here that by no means did the entire Nationalist
navy evacuate to Taiwan. Most of the personnel that had been sent to the
United States in the 1930s and 1940s were committed to the establishment of a
strong Chinese navy and knew this would not be possible under the
Nationalist regime. The many defections that were at least partially
responsible for the demoralization of the Kuomintang government, managed
to form the nucleus of the navy for the People's Republic of China.
Meanwhile in Taiwan, under the protection of the US Seventh Fleet,
the Republic of China's (ROC) Navy spent this period (1949-1953) rebuilding
and reorganizing itself into a combat force. The old Military Advisory Group
in China (MAGIC), was reinstituted as JUSMAG (Joint United States Military
Advisory Group) by the United States in May 1951. Hundreds of newly-
appointed US naval advisors assisted in obtaining ships and supplies while
advising the ROC Navy on operations, training, logistics, and intelligence.
Of course the PRC's attitude became one of total opposition to the
United States at this time. Between 1949 and 1953, several factors, including:
American assistance to the Republic of China (ROC), the US Seventh Fleet's
presence in the Taiwan Strait, strong American anti-communist rhetoric, and
finally, the US participation and overwhelming success in the Korean War,
all contributed to feelings of opposition to, if not hatred for, the United States.
These factors will be discussed in this chapter showing the growing
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importance of the American factor in the development of the Chinese navy
and its operating maritime doctrine.
A. THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRC NAVY
The initial development of Chinese Communist naval forces stems
from its foundation in late 1945 when Soviet forces occupied Manchuria. The
Soviets seem to have been the driving force in the first significant moves
toward the establishment of Communist China's naval force. However, at
this time the US Seventh Fleet had effectively sealed off the Chinese coast
from any significant Soviet naval operations.
After the civil war approached its climax in September 1949, Mao
Zedong addressed the first session of the National Political Consultative
Conference which laid the groundwork for the establishment of the People's
Republic of China (PRC). At this conference, Mao announced the new
(future) goals of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and Navy (PLAN).
Our national defense will be strengthened and we won't permit any
imperialist to encroach any more upon our territory. Based on the gallant
and tested People's Liberation Army, the people's armed forces of ours
must be maintained and developed. We shall not only have a powerful
army, but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy. [Ref. 1, p 183]
The goals of the new navy at this time according to the naval
commander and political commissar, Zhang Aiping,* were:
To build up a skeleton naval arm to be used as the basis for the creation
of a powerful People's Navy of the future, in order to destroy the sea
blockade of liberated China, to support the land and air forces of the PLA
* Zhang Aiping was an army general by profession, but as commander of the navy, he convened
a naval planning conference where by, ".. .organization and regularization of the new naval
force, political reeducation of the many former ROC naval personnel, repair of damaged or
deteriorating ships and naval facilities, and the establishment of naval schools,..." were
established as immediate goals. (Ref. 2, p. 14)
27
in defense of Chinese soil, and to wipe out all remnants of the reactionary
forces. [Ref. 2, p 14]
Mao's early endorsement for building a navy was predicated on several
real maritime threats: the Nationalists still occupied many offshore islands
and Taiwan: Chiang K'ai-shek's navy controlled the sealanes to and from the
mainland and; the U.S. Navy, just offshore, had the only significant naval
force in the Western Pacific. In fact Mao, a staunch continentalist who had no
real naval forces to speak of at the end of the civil war, cared little about the
navy or the sea. Naval forces at this time were seen as a dubious commodity
in defense of the coast.
In December 1949, two months after the founding of the PRC, Mao
traveled to Moscow where he remained until February 1950. This visit
produced the first provisions for Soviet naval aid and advice as was evidence
by an increased Soviet naval presence in China following the Treaty of
Alliance and Mutual Assistance.
A Soviet Naval Advisory Mission was established in early 1950, when
over 500 Soviet naval advisors arrived in China. Approximately 100 advisors
were sent to the navy headquarters in Beijing while the remainder went to
the Chinese fleet and support facilities. It has been reported that there were
Soviet advisors on every staff and ship in the PRC Navy and as a result,
Soviet naval thinking was applied in every possible circumstance. [Ref. 2, p
19]
China's advocates of naval expansion apparently wasted little time
convincing Mao to seek naval aid and advice from the Soviet Union in
building its own fleet. Virtually all naval construction during the first decade
of the PRC Navy was undertaken with the guidance and assistance of the
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Soviets. It is important to note that there were no significant naval
accomplishments in the first year or so of Soviet aid however, China's desires
to model its navy after the Soviets became evident in 1951, when the Chinese
Navy Deputy Commander, Wang Hongkun, stated:
The Soviet Navy is an example for the Navy of the Chinese people and
is the direction of construction of the Chinese People's Navy. We should
learn from the great Red Navy in order to speed up the building of a
powerful people's navy. [Ref. 1, p 193]
In the aftermath of the Communist victory on mainland China,
President Truman's official policy was one of "noninterference." However,
on 24 June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, and on the 27th of June,
Truman reversed the US policy toward Taiwan with the following statement:
The occupation of Taiwan by Communist forces would be a direct
threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the U.S. forces performing
their lawful and necessary functions in the area. Accordingly, I have
ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a
corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on
Formosa to cease all air a id sea operations against the mainland. [Ref. 2, p
17]
Despite this official policy of the United States, the Nationalist in 1950
tasked their naval and air force units to interfere with Communist maritime
activities whenever possible. [Ref. 1, p 185] While this order was in violation
of the US neutralization policy, the Nationalists continued to carry out
guerrilla raids against the Communist held islands and shipping traffic,
bound to and from the mainland, virtually unopposed. The lack of any real
action by the US Seventh Fleet against the Nationalists raids prompted the
PRC government to brand the United States, "...a protector of Nationalist
aggression." [Ref. 1, p 186]
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The existence of a hostile Taiwan , supported by the powerful US
Seventh Fleet, colored the development of the PRC Navy at least into the
1970s. [Ref. 2, p 18]
From 1950 to 1953, the Korean War had the full attention of the PRC
and the PLA, which turned out to be significant in the development of
China's navy. The war all but drained the available resources for military
development, especially the funds for naval development. The Chinese
Navy did not participate in the Korean War per se, but for their minimal part
they did ferry some supplies to the Communist forces in North Korea. The
war was also an intense learning experience which had a long term benefit for
the People's Liberation Army/Navy (PLAN). For the Communist side at
least, the Korean War was solely a land and air war, leaving the navy in
abeyance. However, it was now understood that the unly reason that the
United States and the United Nations could fight in Korea was in a large way
due to American seapower. Merchant shipping from the West had the
protection of naval escorts, and US aircraft carriers off the Korean coast went
unchallenged as they launched repeated air strikes against the Communist
forces on North Korea. This would later serve to enhance the position of the
Chinese naval advocates who believed it was necessary for the PRC to obtain
a navy strong enough to prevent another country from violating China's
territory.
Mao, extremely frustrated by the success of American sea power in the
Korean War, equated the situation to Taiwan in mid 1950, when the lack of
Chinese seapower kept the Chinese ground forces from winning the war.
Mao is quoted to have stated that:
...Our failure to win a decisive victory in Korea is attributed to our poor
naval force. In March 1951, I suggested to Comrade Stalin that the Soviet
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Union should use her submarines in Asian waters, but he chose a
cautious attitude for fear that it should give the capitalistic imperialists an
excuse for expanding the war into the continent. [Ref. 2, p 20]
A top priority in the PLA Navy's long term plan was rapid
modernization of naval bases and shipyards which required extensive outside
aid and technology. In 1951 the first transfers of naval weapons and advisors
from the USSR arrived in China, when about 50 World War II era torpedo
boats were delivered.! Soviet assistance was provided for under the terms
agreed to by Mao and Stalin in Moscow (February 1950). United States
intelligence reports indicated that,
...The Soviets believed building the PRC Navy was so important that
they were willing sacrifice operational ships of their own for the Chinese
cause. [Ref. 2, p 291
As the Korean War was coming to a close, Mao was free to take a new
look at his navy. Mao took an active interest in redefining the navy's
responsibilities in December 1953 after over 90 incidents of Nationalist
interference with international shipping destined for the PRC. He directed
the navy to follow three strategic goals:
1. Eliminate Nationalist naval interference and thereby insure
maritime safety in navigation and transport.
2. Participate in the recovery of Taiwan at an appropriate time.
3. Oppose imperialist aggression from the sea. [Ref. 1, p 186]
With this, a massive effort was begun to restore China's coastal
defenses. This effort included building defensive positions around Qingdao
* In Bruce Swanson's Eighth Voyagle of The Dragon, he notes John Gittings evidence that,
"...Soviet penetration, particularly in the more technical fields, extends down to the lowest
levels and smallest units of the Chinese Communist naval training organization." (Office of
Naval Intelligence [ONI] Review, declassified [September 1951]).
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and on the islands located in the sea approaches to the port there. Similar
efforts were undertaken on the southern bank of the Yangzi River and in the
south on the Pearl River. The new coastal defense system bore a strong
resemblance to the coastal defense strategy of China's dynastic past. The
strategic concepts from the Ming dynasty, known as neiluan waihuan and
haifang meaning "inside disorder invites outside calamity" and "sea
protection" respectively, seem to have been the basis for the new naval
strategy. Again, the navy was designed to be defensive and coastal in nature,
not aggressive and ocean going. [Ref. 1, p 187]
The positioning of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait severely
limited any offensive action the PRC might have preferred to take in an effort
to reclaim Taiwan. The Korean War, occurring when it did, deprived the
PRC from victory in its own civil war and saddled the government for
decades thereafter with an aggressively hostile challenge to its legitimacy
firmly entrenched just offshore. [Ref. 2, p 18]
B. THE US - TAIWAN CONNECTION
From the middle of [950, while the Communists were engaging the
help of the Soviets, the ROC Navy had begun operations in the coastal waters
of the mainland. According to Lcdr. David Muller, USN, ten objectives were
outlined to the Seventh Fleet's liaison officer in Taipei (October 1950). They
were:
The ROC Navy intended to (1) blockade the deep-water ports of China;
(2) engage and sink the major units of the PRC Navy; (3) attack all
concentrations of junks; (4) land commandos to destroy coastal military
installations and collect intelligence; (5) patrol and "ransack" coastal and
island areas; (6) occupy certain islands for use as bases for the interdiction
of coastal traffic; (7) keep ships on alert at forward bases for combat action
as required; (8) conduct reconnaissance by means of naval or fishing
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vessels; (9) defend the coasts and ports of Taiwan and the occupied
offshore islands; and (10) blockade and seize PRC-occupied offshore
islands. [Ref. 2, pp 20-21]
For the next decade the ROC Navy remained active in each of these
areas. While the US Seventh Fleet was patrolling the strait, the ROC Navy
was in no way capable of making any offensive attacks against the mainland.
The PRC naval operations that occurred during this period were almost
exclusively defensive in nature. The PRC naval ships and craft remained
close to the coast and islands where they could receive fire support from the
coastal artillery sites if necessary, and they generally tried to avoid
confrontation with the Natiotialists naval forces. [Ref. 2, p 21]
Hostilities in the strait had taken on a new light in August 1952 when
the ROC recaptured three islands it had previously given up.* October 1952
marked the beginning of extensive ROC campaigns to harass and ultimately
recover many of the offshore islands in the strait area. In January 1953, the
newly inaugurated President Eisenhower ordered the strait, "deneutralized"
and at the time the move was described as having an "unleashing" effect for
Chiang Kai-shek's forces. [Ref. 2, p 23] In effect, the American president's
action greatly increased the alarm of the PRC.
While these annoying raids continued into 1954, no significant changes
in the strategic balance between the PRC and the ROC took place. In
December 1953, the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), assessed the
situation in the strait as follows:
* The three islands were, Nanji and Beiji in the northern Taiwan Strait and Nanpeng in the
south, near the port of Shantou. See map, following page: The Offshore Islands in the Taiwan
Strait. [Ref. 2, p 221
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The PRC Navy, Air Force, and Army were now stronger in the strait
area than their ROC counterparts, but seemed to be taking relatively little
interest in the 25-odd offshore islands then held by ROC forces." [Ref. 2, p
23]
ONI suggested that this was in part due to the concerns of the Korean
War, and that the coastal area facing Taiwan was isolated from the rest of
China and could easily take second priority to the PRC's many other concerns.
The situation in the offshore islands was about to change.
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III. THE COLD WAR PHILOSOPHY: 1953-1968
It was during this period that China exploded its first atomic bomb and
Russia sent Sputnik into space. Both of these events diminished the almost
supernatural awe with which most Chinese looked upon the military might
of the United States. On 2 February 1953, the newly inaugurated President
Eisenhower announced in his State of the Union Address that he was,
Issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to
shield Communist China [from an attack by Nationalist forces]. While the
President did say the order did not implied aggressive intent against "Red
China," he also stated that, ...we [the United States] certainly have no
obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea. [Ref. 3, p 64]
This announcement was commonly perceived as an "unleashing" of
Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces from the limited and unsuccessful
restrictions of the US Seventh Fleet, in effect giving Chiang a free hand to
continue his attacks against the PRC's naval forces and the Communist held
islands. At the time, a commentator described the president's announcement
as "taking the girdle off" the Seventh Fleet.
Perhaps making tensLons between the PRC and the US worse, on 6
February 1953, US Representative Dewey Short (R-Mo.), House Armed
Services Committee chairman, reported that the President and his advisors
were studying proposals for a naval blockade of Communist China.
However, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the Joint Chiefs believed a blockade by the US
alone might split the allies and bring on war with the Soviet Union; and that
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the flow of US arms to the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa was "stepping
up." [Ref. 3, p 64]
On 2 September 1953, (after the signing of the Korean armistice on July
27) Secretary Dulles warned Communist China that,
A renewal of the Korean conflict or a transfer of Communist forces
into Indo-China might mean war against the mainland itself. The US had
learned one lesson from the Korean conflict: If events are likely which
will in fact lead us to fight, let us make clear our intentions in advance;
then we shall probably not have to fight. [Ref. 3, p 65]
With these and other announcements the United States and the Soviet
Union were setting the stage for the Cold War philosophies that would
dominate the world's strategic balance for the next 40 years. At the same
time, the PRC and the Soviet Union were strengthening a relationship, that
would greatly impact the Chinese perceptions of the US, and would be the
foundation for the developinent of the PRC Navy.
In the PRC, the United States was seen as the only major threat to
Chinese security in this era. The American presence in East Asia was based
largely on seapower, specifically the US Seventh Fleet, a formidable armed
presence just off China's coast. The Chinese government believed that it was
the US Navy that had kept the PLA from invading Taiwan in 1950 and in
effect had prevented the Communist from complete victory in the civil war.
Next, American seapower had played a key role in Korea, preventing a North
Korean victory in the war and making possible the northward movement of
the front to the Chinese border, thus bringing the PRC into a long and costly
conflict. And to top it all, the Chinese were about to find out that US naval
power would play a key role in the offshore island crisis of 1955 and in the
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Jinmen crisis of 1958, frustrating long range Chinese strategic goals
concerning Taiwan.
Perhaps on a larger scale, the PRC also saw a US threat directly to the
east in America's limited rearmament of Japan; which was China's bitter
enemy of earlier decades. US involvement in this regard led the PRC to
describe the American policies in Japan, as responsible for the "revival of
Japanese militarism." Furthering tensions, and adding fuel to the Chinese
perception that the Americans had imperialist intentions, the US had
military bases in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. [Ref. 2, pp 46-47]
Between 1953 and 1968, as the Cold War intensified, the United States
and the Soviet Union, although at opposite poles, showed that the policies of
these two states were the dominate factors in the evolution of the Chinese
navy. At the heart of this fact were, Soviet help to the PRC and the American
commitment to the Nationalists in the offshore islands. Soviet help slacked
off after the diplomatic split in 1960, and in the heady years of the Cultural
Revolution the PRC had almost no energy to spare for naval affairs.
A. THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS
Within one year after the hostilities of the Korean War ended, the
Chinese Communists actively resumed the civil war against the Nationalists.
In early 1954 the PRC had been conducting only a "holding action" in the
Taiwan Strait as it was heavily committed in Korea and could not afford to
open a second front. The renewed war against the Nationalists began again
on 3 September 1954 when the ROC occupied island of Jinmen was brought
under heavy artillery fire from the mainland. In the last week of September
1954, it became obvious that the previous attack of Jinmen was in fact a
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diversion and that the real focus of the PRC's aggression was further north in
the strait, in the Dachep. Island group. [Ref. 2, p 24]
The Dachen group consists of five major islands off the coast of
Zhejiang Province, and are located 200 nautical miles north of Taiwan.*
These islands were the Nationalists' northernmost offshore outpost and
functioned as the base for operations against the Zhejiang coast. Between 15
and 17 May 1954, several minor naval engagements took place in the Dachen
area. While naval vessels on both sides were damaged, the PRC lost only one
small gunboat. The US naval attach6 in Taipei commented that the attacks
represented, "...an increased willingness of the PRC naval forces to engage the
Nationalists at sea." [Ref. 2, p 26]
By February 1955, the Nationalists had lost control of the entire Dachen
Island group and, the US Seventh Fleet was asked for assistance from Taipei
in the evacuation of the remaining Nationalists forces. On the same day, US
forces assisted the ROC in the withdrawal, in effect warned the PRC not to
interfere. On 8 February 1)55, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov passed
word to the United States from China that PRC forces would not fire on
American ships unless they were attacked first.
Three important diplomatic events occurred during this period that
had a lasting effect on events in the Taiwan Strait area. First, in seeking help
from the US with the evacuation, the ROC also sought a commitment from
the US to defend the more southerly offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu.
Second, on 29 January 1955, President Eisenhower signed the Formosa
Resolution. He said adoption of the resolution was,
See map, following page: Dachen Islands and vicinity. [Ref. 2, p 25]
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...A step to preserve the peace in the Formosa area. We are ready to
support a United Nations effort to end the present hostilities in the area,
but we are also united in our determination to defend an area vital to the
security of the United States and the free world. [Ref. 3, p 72]
Finally, on 9 February 1955, the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee approved the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, which
guaranteed American protection of Taiwan and the mid-strait Penghu
Islands, but stopped short of promising intervention in the event of an attack
on the other offshore islands. The treaty required the United States and
Nationalist China to:
1. Maintain and develop "jointly by self-help and mutual aid" their
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and
Communist subversion directed against them "from without."
2. Cooperate in economic development.
3. Consult on implementation of the treaty.
4. Act to meet an armed attack "in the West Pacific area directed
against the territories" of either the US or the Republic of China,
including Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and "such other
territories as may be determined by mutual agreement." [Ref. 3, p
73]
Thus, although it had lost an important offshore island position, the
ROC had gained an American commitment to its security against invasion
from the mainland.
The offshore islands situation remained quiet while revolution raged
in Central Europe. Then in the early summer of 1958, it had become apparent
from the PRC troop movements opposite Jinmen that China had chosen the
island as the focus for a renewed effort against the ROC offshore positions.
Perhaps the Chinese judged that the Russians, after their difficulties in
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Poland and Hungary, would at last become free to help the Chinese if needed.
Furthermore, it would be good to test the heart and mind of Khrushchev, the
new Russian leader. Naval deployments to the area began in July when a
squadron of torpedo boats was transported by rail from its base in Shanghai to
Xiamen, opposite Jinmen. At the same time, approximately 180 MiG-15s and
17s were positioned at five different airfields in the strait area. The first air
battles took place on 14 August 1958.
As intelligence reports on the increased PRC activity came in, the US
Seventh Fleet shifted its destroyer patrols from the Philippines into the
Taiwan Strait in late July 1958. On 4 August, the aircraft carrier Lexington was
ordered to the Taiwan area and, it arrived east of Taiwan on the 8th of
August. On 22 August in response to heightened tensions, the US Chief of
Naval Operations decided to position two additional carriers, with their
escorts and support ships, off Taiwan.
On 23 August 1958, the PRC open fired with heavy artillery on Jinmen
and increased their air patrols. US Pacific intelligence (CINCPAC) assessed
the situation as follows:
An invasion of the offshore islands appeared imminent, with the only
restraining element being the US Seventh Fleet and its capability to aid the
Nationalists, if so ordered. [Ref. 2, p 35]
As it became evident that the confrontation would be a major one, on
23 August, the carrier E -sex was ordered to leave its patrol in the
Mediterranean and proceed at high speed to the Western Pacific. At the same
time in Pearl Harbor, the carrier Midway was ordered to make ready for sea
and proceed to the Taiwan area. On the 24th of August, the commander of
the Seventh Fleet ordered his ships in the strait area to "escort and protect"
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ROC Navy ships in international waters, but not to enter into battle unless in
self-defense. [Ref. 2, p 36]
As the artillery fire from the PRC continued against the Nationalist
held islands in August of 1958, the carrier Hancock and her escorts arrived off
Taiwan. The following day, a third airc-aft carrier, the Shangri-La, joined the
Lexington and the Hancock in a large-scale air defense exercise in the area.
The antisubmarine aircraft carrier Princeton arrived to support the three
attack carriers on the same day. Also on 28 August, the carrier Essex transited
the Suez Canal and Midway departed Pearl Harbor for the Western Pacific.
Only five days after the artillery barrage against Jinmen began, the US
Navy had four aircraft carriers on station off the coast, with two more on the
way. The carriers were all accompanied by their escort ships, plus a cruiser
and 12 destroyers were present in the Jinmen area itself. The presence of this
substantial armada, poised to bring extremely heavy firepower to bear against
the Chinese forces ashore and afloat, could not but have had a sobering effect
on the PRC government and military authorities. [Ref. 2, p 36]
Despite the overwhelming US presence in the area, the PRC
maintained an effective blockade which prevented the ROC from getting
supplies through to Jinmen.* In light of the PRC's continued success, the US
led its first resupply effort into territorial waters on 7 September 1958. In the
meantime, the carrier Midway had arrived from Hawaii, making for a total of
five US carriers in the region. The Chinese were in no way prepared or
willing to fire on US ships for fear of inviting retaliation from the multiple-
* The US effort was not successful prior to this because they were not allowed inside
territorial waters (3 nautical miles from any land). The PRC naval forces on the other hand
steamed freely in and out of the 3 mile boundary, thus making any US attempts to prevent PRC
interception of Nationalist resupply vessels impossible.
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carrier task force. As a result, the resupply of Jinmen was allowed to take
place and needless to say, the PRC's blockade had been broken.
While the crisis continued for several more weeks, it became evident
that the PRC had lost. Nevertheless, the US maintained four to five carriers
on station until 28 September 1958. [Ref. 2, p 37] Once again, the PRC had
been deprived from victory by American seapower. This 1958 defeat forced
the PRC to the realization that its own navy was grossly inferior and ill-
equipped. It is quite possible that the events in the Taiwan Strait only eased
the decision of the PRC to enhance their program of naval assistance from the
Soviet Union.
B. SINO-SOVIET COOPERATION
Between 1951 and 1954, the Chinese had received their first naval aid
from the USSR with the delivery of 50, P 4 motor torpedo boats which made
up the major offensive striking force of the PRC Navy. Also during this
period, the Chinese received one M-class short-range submaiine, and three S
1-class submarines. One of the more significant Soviet material additions to
the PLAN fleet came in 1954 with a shipment of four Gordy-class destroyers,
six Kronstadt-class submarine chasers, and two T 43-class minesweepers.
During the early and mid 1950's, the PLAN had acquired a number of
surface ships and submarines but it was not until 1954 that the PRC had a
significant naval air arm. In 1954 there were only two naval air divisions
with about 80 aircraft and all of the pilots and ground crews were being
trained by Soviet and PLA Air Force personnel. By 1960 the PRC naval air
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arm had 500 aircraft, mostly jet fighters and light jet bombers,* based near the
coast for coastal air defense and protection of shipping, and offensively for
operations against the offshore islands and hostile shipping.
By the end of the Korean War, the Soviets were regularly criticizing the
US overseas bases as infringements upon local sovereignty and as evidence of
hostile American intentions. Moscow, in an attempt to demonstrate its lack
of "imperialist" ambitions, while increasing China's prestige among other
Third World countries, began to cease its occupption of Chinese territories
beginning with their pull-out from the port of Lushun in 1955.*
Despite the absence of operational Soviet naval forces in China after
1955, the pervasive Soviet influence continued. Most ships in the Chinese
fleet and nearly all weapon!. and equipment were of Soviet design or origin.
Soviet instructors were key members of the faculty at every naval training
center in China, and they imparted Soviet tactical doctrine to an "unschooled
but eager cadre" of Chinese naval officers. At the same time, senior Chinese
officers spent years in command and staff courses in the Soviet Union. Upon
their return to China, these officers implemented Soviet organizational
philosophy and doctrines governing force development and employment to
the PRC Navy. It is noteworthy to point out that the present chairman of
China's Military Affairs Commission, Liu Huaqing, attended the Voroshilov
Naval Academy in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Liu was (and still is) an
advocate of Soviet Admiral Gorshkov's belief in high-technology and
modern equipment essential for naval buildup. [Ref. 10, p 17]
The first 80 aircraft were all propeller driven. It was in 1955 that jet aircraft were
introduced to China and the designs were exclusively Soviet. These aircraft included: MiG-
15s, MiG-17s (fighters), and the 11-28 (jet bomber).
* See map, following page: The China seas and the continental shelf. [Ref. 2, p 6]
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From 1955 on, after an influx of shipbuilding experts to China, Soviet
naval assistance consisted of helping China build modern warships in
Chinese shipyards. By 1956, nearly 100 small district patrol craft (YPs) had
been produced in China with Soviet assistance and an ambitious naval
construction effort was underway in Shanghai. With Soviet assistance, the
shipyard at Shanghai was undertaking the construction of the modern, Riga-
class escort destroyer, the conventionally powered* W-class submarine, the
Kronstadt-class antisubmarine craft, T 43 minesweepers, and the new class P 6
motor torpedo boat. All were of Soviet design. [Ref. 1, p 196]
In 1956 the desire for advanced technology was expressed during the
Eighth Party Congress when a Chinese spokesman stated:
In leading scientific wyork, the Party should rely on scientists to the
fullest extent. Modern sciences are finely divided into various fields.
Only the specialists know the fine points of a certain field of science.
When we have scientific problems, we must learn humbly from
specialists. [Ref. 1, p 197]
With this, China's Academy of Military Science (CAMS) was
established in the hope of combining the advanced Soviet military sciences
with China's efforts to modernize its military. Prior to the establishment of
CAMS, most of the equipment to be used aboard naval vessels in the PRC was
shipped pre-assembled from the USSR and simply installed in China. [Ref. 2,
p 30] While the Chinese were learning form this process, they were in no way
capable of running a modern shipbuilding program of their own. This would
become evident after the Soviets withdrew their assistance in 1960 following
the Sino-Soviet split.
* Conventional power meaning diesel engine and battery propulsion.
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The total Soviet role in the planning and execution of Chinese naval
operations is unknown, but as late as January 1959, navy Commander Xiao
Jingguang was reportedly meeting with Soviet naval advisors, "...to discuss
the defense mission in the East China Sea area." The US naval attach6 in
Taipei (March 1959) reported that, "The PRC Navy was a faithful, miniature
replica of the Russian Navy." [Ref. 2, p 33]
The PRC Navy in 1960 had come a long way in its first decade of
existence with the aid of the Soviet Union. At the time of the navy's
founding in 1950, it was made up of Nationalist defectors and PLA
infantrymen. Muller states that in 1950,
The navy consisted of a diverse collection of patrol craft built in five
countries over three decades, all in doubtful condition; ten years later,
most of the old ships and craft had either been retired or had been refitted
with uniform Soviet equipment, and whole classes of modern warships
and submarines were under construction. At its beginning, the PRC Navy
was utterly incapable of defending China against even the most minor
incursion; by 1960, it had become the largest and most capable indigenous
naval force in East Asia. [Ref. 2, p 391
An ONI Review of the Chinese Navy in 1960 stated the following:
The PRC Navy possessed almost 350 ships, submarines, and small
combatant craft. In addition to the 20-odd patrol craft inherited from the
ROC Navy, the PRC now had 4 World War II-era Soviet Gordy class
destroyers, and 4 new Riga class frigates. Also built from Soviet plans or
transferred in finished form from the USSR were, 24 Kronstadt class large
patrol craft, some 140 torpedo boats, and a dozen ocean minesweepers.
Perhaps of prime importance, 9 coastal submarines of various classes had
been transferred from the USSR and 17 of the postwar W class had been
assembled in Chinese yards from Soviet components. The navy also had
about 30 amphibious landing ships of US World War II origin, all of
which had defected from the ROC Navy or had been captured. [Ref. 2, p
40]
It was an article of fact at this time that the greatest threat to China's
security came from the United States, and the chief instrument of American
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power in East Asia was the US Navy. China's Navy Vice Commander, Zhou
Xihan's statement was typical of the underlying beliefs of the time:
In the past hundred years, as a result of our complete lack of coastal
defense, imperialist aggression against us has come mostly from the sea.
Our people have realized from historical experience that naval defense is
an important component part of national defense and that our national
defense would not be solid unless there is a powerful naval defense force.
Therefore (we) have always hoped for the building of a naval force capable
of repulsing imperialist aggression from the sea. [Ref. 2, p 471
C. THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT (1960)
Since the Chinese and the Russian peoples had very different histories,
self-images, needs, and goals, it is not surprising that a major split
developed between them on several levels at once. Memory made them
suspicious of each other: the Mongol horde of the thirteenth century had
enslaved South Russia; Tsarist imperialists had encroached on China's
Northeast, Mongolia, and Turkestan. Behind the Commnunist fraternal
rhetoric, history provided few bonds of mutual admiration. [Ref. 34, p 964]
The PRC Navy in its second decade underwent several trying events.
The PLAN's troubles began with the withdrawal of Soviet assistance in mid-
1960 (the Sino-Soviet split) and continued its downward trend with Mao's
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in 1966. It was a period of
great strain and debate as the Cl 1.iese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA
argued over how best to achieve China's strategic goals. These goals were:
(1) How to assure national security; (2) How to attain great power
status; (3) How to achieve unification with Taiwan and; (4) How to
promote revolution and socialism in the world. [Ref. 1, p 224]
The Sino-Soviet split had an immediate and devastating effect on both
naval development and operational readiness. The withdrawal of Soviet
assistance to China in mid 1960 brought virtually all PRC naval construction
to an abrupt halt. While as many as 2,000 advisors had been assisting the PRC
in 1953, by early 1960 the number was down to 150. Approximately 30
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advisors were at naval headquarters in Beijing and the remainder of the 150
were at the various shipyard and naval schools. By 1961 these remaining
advisors were gone, and many of the PRC naval vessels were out of
commission due to the lack of spare parts and maintenance expertise from
the USSR.
Naval development was highly important to the national leadership
however, and beginning in 1962 a resurgence in both construction and
operation got under way. However, fuel for ships became a problem as the
Soviets slashed their exports to China by 40 percent.* Maintenance and fuel
problems combined to reduce the tempo of Chinese naval operations which
had an adverse effect on the navy's tactical proficiency and general
operational readiness. Furthermore, there was no way the Chinese could
acquire what they needed from the United States because of the lack of formal
recognition.
In both construction and operational terms the navy was at a near
standstill for the two years following the break with the Soviet Union. But as
a result, priorities were set to make naval development a self-reliant system,
one capable of operations without foreign advice or supplies. Between 1962
and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in late 1966, expenditures on
naval construction in China rose about 600%. This increase went hand in
hand with the PRC's overall defense budget. Military use of Chinese
industrial products comprised 25% of the national output in 1966. [Ref. 2, p
91] Both the naval and national leadership had learned how vulnerable
* At this time, China was importing over 60 percent of its oil from the Soviet Union and
the 40% reduction was considered ca drastic cut.
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China had become by depending on foreign countries for technical advice and
naval construction.
D. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1966)
In the summer of 1966, Premier Zhou Enlai expressed the seriousness
of the situation that had developed in China, commonly termed the Cultural
Revolution. He defined the Cultural Revolution as a "struggle" where,
The Chinese wanted to liquidate entirely by this "cultural revolution"
all the old ideas, the entire old culture, all the old habits and customs
created by the exploiting classes in the course of thousands of years of
poisoning people .... We want to create a form in the ranks of the broad
masses of the people the new ideas, the new culture, the new habits and
customs of the proletariat. Zhou added that the "main cutting edge of this
cultural revolution is turned against a handful of bad elements that are
waging dirty anti-Communist activity under the cover of a false
communism." [Ref. 1, p 237]
By late 1966 as a result of the Cultural Revolution, all services
experienced a purge of their best officers. The man charged with overseeing
the next phase of China's naval modernization program was the new
chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, Marshal Lin Biao. Of all of
China's senior military leaders, Lin was the man Mao trusted most.
In the early days of the Cultural Revolution, the navy continued to
train at an accelerated rate, but the renewed emphasis on political instruction
caused serious rifts in the PRC's naval leadership. Adding to the frustration
of naval commanders, Mao urged the shortening of military education at
training schools. He said that if the illiterate soldiers of the Red Army could
defeat the Kuomintang's military staff college graduates, then schooling could
be shortened. Mao's views were quickly accepted and one of the first naval
training policies to succumb was the submarine policy of 30% non-qualified
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crewmen to 70% qualified crewmen. It was replaced by a system whereby,
submarine deployments were approved with as many as 80% of the crew
newly assigned and not properly trained.
Disagreements created serious political and technical problems in the
shipyards as well. In 1967, rebel groups composed of Maoists and anti-Maoists
vied for leadership positions in the shipyards for nearly six months. By the
end of December 1967, the power struggle became so violent that the shipyard
in Shanghai had to be shut down. Subsequently, a naval unit was sent into
the yard to stabilize the situation. These struggles had a serious impact on the
PRC's naval construction capabilities. During the Cultural Revolution,
China produced only 16 major combatant ships, all of which had been
previously under construction. The Chinese did manage to build small ships
but, these vessels already had prototypes built prior to the Cultural
Revolution and did not require a high level of construction skills or
technological knowledge to produce.
In the words of Bruce Swanson,
If the Cultural Revolution was intended to reinforce technological
isolationism, to lay stress on coastal defenses, and to emphasize politics at
the expense of operational training and strategic weapons development,
then it accomplished its goals. [Ref. 1, p 250]
In summary, the Cultural Revolution's general effect on the navy was
to render it "catatonic." The navy did not progress during this period, but
seemed to go into a state of suspension while political turmoil ran rampant.
The Cultural Revolution cost the navy valuable time in its modernization
programs and it stunted the growth of many in the officer corps who believed
the radical slogans that said, "nothing could be or should be learned from
bourgeoisie navies." [Ref. 1, p 253]
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Professor, John K. Fairbank described this period of China's history as
follows:
...the Cultural Revolution is generally seen as "ten lost years" in
China's modern development. The wanton destructiveness of ignorant
teenagers; the reign of terror against members of the intellectual and
official establishments; the harassment, jailing, beating, torture, and often
killing perpetrated against something like a million victims were an
enormous human and cultural disaster. [Ref. 34, p 971]
With the Cultural Revolution barely over, China again found itself
threatened, this time at her borders to the north with the USSR and to the
south in Vietnam by the escalation of US military action. China's fears of
"being encircled by imperialists" caused new attention to be paid to the
perceived naval threat from the United States.
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IV. NEW ATrENTION TO FOREIGN POLICY: 1968-1976
Despite the disruption of the early 1960s, the aftermath of the Sino-
Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution, the Navy managed to mature into a
unified and well organized armed force by the mid 1970s. New attention was
showered on foreign policy. The Vietnam War and the failed coup attempt of
Lin Biao (1971) were both relevant to China's evolving foreign policy. It is
during this late period in China's long history that the navy again became a
vital player in Chinese foreign relations. During the last years of Mao
Zedong, and the re-establishment of relations with the United States, the
American factor brought about an entirely new stage in Chinese naval
development.
With the struggles of the Cultural Revolution over, China found itself
engaged in a border dispute with the USSR. In March 1969, Soviet and
Chinese border guards clashed on the Wusuli River over the 1.5 mile long
island of Zhenpao; known to the Soviets as Damansky. During the course of
the next several months, a number of small skirmishes broke out along the
3,500 mile Sino-Soviet border, some as far west as the Xinjiang Province.
Both the Chinese and the Soviets sent the other strong letters of protest over
these incidents, each promising strong measures if the other government
persisted with armed confrontation.
The Soviet's ultimate re- nse to the skirmishes was to send large
numbers of ground forces into the common border area in late 1969; the total
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reached an estimated 40 to 50 divisions! This in turn led the Chinese to
charge that the Soviets were installing launching pads for nuclear missiles
along China's, Soviet and Mongolian borders, believed ultimately, "for use
against China." [Ref. 1, p 254] Soviet help could no longer be depended upon
as the great hope against American naval encroachment, until the Tet
Offensive in Vietnam.
China's fears of, 'being encircled by imperialists," were heightened by
the escalation of US military action at the southern edge of their country.
American air strikes in North Vietnam were a common occurrence, and the
total number of US militar" personnel in Vietnam was steadily increasing.
Frequent reports of US spy planes being shot down over China, Chinese
protests of the over-flights, and increased US naval activity in the South
China Sea, produced a paranoia in Beijing among Lin Biao* and his followers.
Until Tet, the Chinese acted on the assumption that US action in Vietnam
was only a prelude to America's real goal in Asia, which was the destruction
of the Chinese Communist system.
While the situation with the Soviets was considered extremely serious,
the United States was still considered to be the greatest threat to China's
security. Fear of hostile American intentions in the region was not a new
attitude among Chinese military strategists or for Lin Biao. However, Lin
* While it may be irrelevant to China's naval development and the American factor, in
order to comprehend the size of the Soviet threat it is important to note that at this time in
Soviet history, the Soviet Army divisions had three different levels of mobilization, called
categories: "A, B, or C." A category "A" division was one hundred percent manned at 10,000-
12,000 troops. Category "B" would be manned at 70 percent of Cat A; while Cat C was "30"
percent, or as few as 3,000 troops. Even if the divisions on the Sino-Soviet borders were all Cat
C, the total number of troops still numbered in excess of 147,000.
* Lin Biao was the Minister of National Defense and the senior vice chairman of the
Military Affairs Commission.
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now believed* that the development of modern weaponry was crucial to
China's survival since they faced the USSR to the north and the United States
to the south. [Ref. 1, p 255]
After Tet, the United States was no longer feared, but it had to be
opposed. Lin believed that the defense budget should be raised, primarily the
better to resist the United States. As confirmation of Lin's attitude, PRC
defense spending increased significantly in 1970. The defense budget rose
from an estimated $5.5 billion between 1964 and 1969, to a total of about $13
billion in 1970. Naval weapons development and planning for a nuclear
submarines moved from the blueprint stage to the assembly line, and
construction of conventionally powered submarines was tripled from a rate
of two units a year, to a rate of six submarines per year between 1968-1974.
Furthermore, China began to increase its production of surface ships. An
additional three Jiangnan-class frigates (making a total of five), approximately
ten Osa and Komar missile-craft, and six new destroyers (the Luda-class), all
produced in the early 1970s, demonstrated China's best technical shipbuilding
effort to date. The PRC research and development institutes were also busy
designing several new classes of frigates that would be armed with
experimental surface to air missiles. [Ref. 4, pp 362-397]
During this period, the Chinese also made several decisions that
showed a new appreciation for naval strategy. The most important decision
was the build up of the South Sea Fleet, which was done to add to China's
* Lin's active role in the Cultural Revolution, where he and others believed in Chinese
political centrality, cultural superiority, and economic self-sufficiency, in effect stifled naval
development. Lin was a strong proponent of maintaining a strong coastal defense and in the
early days of the Vietnam war believed that the PRC should not become involved in the
confrontation to the south.
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credibility among the other nations and navies in the region. Swanson notes
that by the mid 1970s, "Lin Biao had oriented China's naval building program
toward an expansionist policy." [Ref. 5, p 951
While a modest increase in naval development was underway in
China, in spite of the interruptions of the Cultural Revolution, there was also
a renewed interest in Chinese contacts with the outside world. Most of the
PRC's foreign relations during this period were designed to counter Soviet
activity in the region. The Soviets had displaced the Americans as enemy
number one. Some of these Chinese contacts had naval implications. The
PRC began to give the navv a role in carrying out Chinese foreign policy,
particularly in state to state diplomacy and military aid programs in the
following areas.
Albania. When Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Treaty
Organization, one month after the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia (August
1968), Mao, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai sent a joint message congratulating
them for "striking a heavy blow to the Soviet revisionists." Shortly following
this congratulatory note, the Chinese sent naval advisors to assist the
Albanians in shoring up the nation's coastal defense with missiles and guns.
The main emphasis concentrated on the Albanian naval base at Saseno,
which was strengthened by the Chinese as a preventative measure against a
possible Soviet naval attack. [Ref. 1, p 256]
Pakistan. In 1970, China concluded an arms agreement with Pakistan
that had provisions for China to supply the Pakistanis with naval hardware.
The PRC in the late 1960s and early 1970s spent a significant amount rnf time
and effort in Pakistan with military delegations and foreign naval exchanges,
57
designed to increase China overseas presence and to .ounter Soviet and
American influence in the region. [Ref. 1, pp 256-2571
Sri Lanka and North Korea. In 1971 China was reported to be
conducting talks with the Sri Lankan government regarding the lease of the
ex-British naval base at Trincomalee for use in the servicing of China's naval
and merchant ships. The naval facility at Trincomalee greatly extended the
range of China's "coastal fleets." Fear of Soviet influence in Korea also
moved the Chinese to strengthen military relations with North Korea. In
September 1971 a new Sino-North Korean military aid agreement was signed
in Beijing. Unlike the 1961 agreement, this one called for the provision of
unspecified PRC naval aid to North Korea. [Ref. 1, p 257]
Whih: these efforts were centered on countering Soviet influence in
the region and extending the PLAN's potential reach, the United States still
remained the primary threat to China's maritime security. The US Seventh
Fleet consisted of several aircraft carriers and dozens of cruisers and
destroyers, supported by major naval bases in Japan, Guam, and the
Philippines. As relations between Washington and Beijing grew colder, the
Vietnam war intensified making China's fear of encirclement worse.
A. THE PRC NAVY IN VIETNAM
The Chinese Navy did not engage in combat during the Vietnam war.
In fact, even the deployment of forces to the South Sea Fleet appeared to be
held at a minimum, as if to send a signal tc the US that the PRC had no
intention of engaging American naval forces in the waters of the Gulf of
Tonkin or near Hainan.
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Chinese coastal defense forces in southern China did remain alert to
US incursions however, particularly to aircraft flying into Chinese airspace.
While US aircraft were under strict orders to remain "well clear" of PRC
airspace during the war, several American pilots, possibly due to
disorientation, did manage to violate Chinese territory. The PRC naval air
force, responsible for defending against intrusions from the south and
seaward, succeeded in intercepting a number of US aircraft and shooting
down several during the course of the war. [Ref. 2, p 100]
Possibly out of respect for the tremendous amount of American
military power in the region, PRC naval and air operations were contained to
China's territorial borders and remained strictly defensive in nature. Chinese
operational assistance to North Vietnam in the maritime sphere was limited
almost entirely to cargo transport operations between ports in southern China
and northern Vietnam, with transits routes strictly restricted to coastal waters.
Again, possibly out of respect for American power, or fear of armed
confrontation with US forces that might have brought the American anti-
Communist campaign into China, the PRC naval units in the South China
Sea remained relatively inactive for the duration of the US presence in
Vietnam, and did not attempt to escort the supply ships bound for North
Vietnam.
As the war continued and after the 1968 Tet Offensive, Muller states
that, "...both the US and the PRC came to understand each other's intentions
more clearly." The political fallout in the United States following the Tet
Offensive led the Chinese to perceive the American threat as a "paper tiger;"
one where the political capital at home was too expensive to risk intense
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involvement of US forces in the Far East. Nevertheless, the Chinese navy
continued to treat the US Seventh Fleet's potential power with great respect,
as became evident in 1970.
In 1970, China began a minor build up of its forces in the South Sea
Fleet, but this build up was modest in comparison to the activity under way
in the North and East Sea fleets where naval construction was progressing
much more rapidly. The cautious approach taken in the south was done is
such a manner so as not to "concern or provoke" the United States. One US
intelligence assessment of the situation stated that,
Newly arrived units at South Sea Fleet bases are not expected to be
deployed to areas where their presence could be interpreted by other
nations as offensive or hostile moves. [Ref. 2, p 101]
The Chinese stayed well clear of the United States for the duration of
American involvement in Vietnam, but in 1971, a shake up of the military's
top leadership would again hinder China's naval development and force a
reexamination of China's military strategy.
B. THE FALL OF LIN BIAO
Border tensions with the USSR, the Vietnam War, and the decision to
modernize all coincided with the rise and fall of Lin Biao. In April 1969 the
Ninth Party Congress convened which turned out to be a stepping stone to
power for Lin Biao and his radical military faction. Lin Biao was a genuine
military hero, primarily because of his victories for China in Manchuria
during the Cultural Revolution. It is relevant to note that a full 45% of the
Ninth Central Committee members (170 full members and 109 alternates)
were PLA representatives. Furthermore, only nine members from the pre-
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Cultural Revolution period Politburo survived membership and among the
twelve new members, seven were navy admirals.
The ascendancy of Lin Biao and his followers to power in the wake of
the Ninth Party Congress threatened many disparate groups in China. A
backlash developed that led to an attempted coup and eventually cost Lin his
life.
It was the severity of policy disputes which brought Lin into direct
confrontation with other interest groups following the Ninth Party Congress.
Disputes over service rivalry and regionalism erupted within the PLAN,
which were fueled by the decision to give the Air Force and Navy a greater
piece of the defense budget, significantly cutting into the Army's traditionally
larger appropriation. Excesses created by the Cultural Revolution, which led
to an increase in non-military duties assigned to the PLA, led to internal
political struggles. Some military leaders, concerned with the massive Soviet
build up on the border and US activities in Vietnam, felt that these political
decisions, regarding the civil use of the PLA, were intolerable. Finally, the
most significant policy dispute centered on a new and daring foreign policy
maneuver being contemplated by Zhou Enlai and apparently approved by
Mao. It involved putting a stop to the "dual adversary strategy" and seeking
detente with the United States. [Ref. 1, pp 258-2591 It meant that China would
now view the USSR as the primary threat to national security and a new
relationship with the United States would be established.
Lin Biao and his followers (avid "anti-American" military
commanders) took strong exception to this last political endeavor by strongly
criticizing Japanese and US naval activities in the Asia-Pacific region.
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Between 1969 and 1971, several news articles quoting Lin and his
subordinates, pointed to the Japanese and US naval threats as paramount to
China's security. Shortly before Dr. Henry Kissinger's first trip to China in
1971, which would lay the groundwork for President Nixon's 1972 visit, one
Chinese press account stated that,
The US Seventh Fleet was an important tool for US imperialism in
pursuing its policy of aggression and war in the Far East and Southeast
Asia. [Ref. 1, p 260]
The issues described above proved to have been a test for the many
factions vying for power in China. While Lin's faction appeared to be in
control at the time, Zhou and several powerful anti-Lin military
commanders, formed a coalition with Madam Mao and her left-wing
Cultural Revolution group. The pressures they were able to generate against
Lin was apparently so great that it forced him into contemplating a coup that
included a plot to assassinate Mao.
When the plot was, discovered in September 1971, the major
conspirators attempted to flee China in an air force VIP aircraft. As luck
would have it, shortly after take-off the plane crashed in Outer Mongolia.
Within weeks of the incident, the outside world began to learn that a high-
level purge had occurred in China. Lin Biao, his wife, the PLA chief, and the
director of the General Logistics Department of the army, all perished.* This
shake-up of China's top military leaders was cause for an internal
reexamination of the entire spectrum of the Chinese military. Needless to
say, this too had important implications for the navy.
* This is the official version of the events that took place up to and including the plane
crash. Doubts have been raised whether Lin Biao was really among the victims of the crash.
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While the navy had very little to do with Defense Minister Lin Biao's
alleged coup attempt in September 1971, he had been very supportive of the
navy and saw to it that the navy was exempted from many of the distractions
of the Cultural Revolution. His death brought about an immediate decline in
military spending and a reevaluation of China's military goals. [Ref. 1, p 261]
Immediately following the fall of Lin Biao, the Chinese armed forces
suffered drastic budget cuts and the navy specifically lost its tempo in naval
construction and almost the entire operating budget. [Ref. 2, p 106]
Nevertheless, in the mid 1970s the Chinese enjoyed a naval victory in the
Paracel Islands over South Vietnam (January 1974), many key officers purged
during the Cultural Revolution were returned to active duty, and the
foundations were laid for further naval expansion and an entirely new
outlook on naval strategy.
C. THE PEOPLE'S WAR AT SEA
A decided change was, about to occur in China's maritime doctrine, and
its major cause was the new relationship with the United States. The Soviet
"Young School" of naval coastal defense strategy which had taken root in
China during the later half of the 1950s remained central to China's maritime
strategic thought before the new relationship with the United States. The
major reason the Chinese took so readily to Young School thinking was that
conceptually it was guerrilla warfare taken to sea. With this thinking, the
PLAN was able to effortlessly apply Mao's prescriptions on guerrilla tactics.
The concealment of forces behind islands or among fishing fleets, and the
rapid concentration of forces for surprise attack was employed effectively
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during the island campaigns against the Nationalists. This mode of naval
combat would become known as the "People's War at Sea." [Ref. 2, p 1151
While this mode of naval combat had served the PRC well against the
ROC Navy in the Taiwan Strait during the 1950s and 1960s, some of the
navy's leadership had concerns over its effectiveness against high
performance aircraft, missiles, ships, and submarines of the US and Soviet
navies. Muller states that,
It was readily admitted in discussions of naval strategy the enemy ships
had a decided technical advantage in size, sophistication and range of
weaponry. [Ref. 2, p 115]
The People's War at Sea was designed to protect the navy from
domestic political attack rather than to serve as a prescription for actual naval
warfare. The most crucial shortcoming of the doctrine was its vagueness in
identifying the enemy against which it was to be employed. Because of the
PRC Navy's realistic and prudent approach of "caution" with regard to the US
Seventh Fleet in the Tonkin Gulf, the People's War at Sea was never tested.
The People's War at Sea doctrine was supported from the top down
among China's military leadership as they were all graduates of the Young
School in the Soviet Union. It was not until the late 1970s, as the Chinese
began to develop maritime economic interests, and as the Soviet Pacific Fleet
became an alarming menace to China's maritime security, that the PRC Navy
turned away from the Young School of naval strategic thought. [Ref. 2, p 115]
D. SHAPING OF A NEW FOREIGN POLICY
During the 1960s, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was lagging well behind the
Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets in the acquisition of new naval ships
and weapons. The Pacific Fleet did not operate regularly in the East or South
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China seas and this minimal naval presence had kept China's threat
assessment of the Soviet Navy relatively low. Nevertheless, throughout the
1960s, China continued to favor its own North and East Sea fleets with most
of its newly built ships and submarines, perhaps indicating a perception of
potential threat from the nerth. [Ref. 2, p 114]
The Sino-Soviet border clashes along the Wusuli River in March 1969
marked a major turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. For the first time, the
Soviet navy came to be explicitly described as a threat to China. In Muller, the
situation was described as follows:
The Soviet revisionist renegade clique is frantically expanding its navy
and building up a fleet with combat ability in far oceans in order to use it
as a strength to back up its contention with US imperialism. [Ref. 2, p 114]
Immediately after the death of Defense Minister Lin Biao, the Chinese
armed forces were subject to drastic budget cutbacks. Military spending,
which had surged by 10%, per year since 1965, plummeted 20% in the year
following the fall of Lin. Perhaps the only positive naval development that
came out of the early 1970s, was that many of the senior officers who had been
purged during the Cultural Revolution were returned to active duty. After
the death of Lin Biao and the purge of his allies, Deng Xiaoping* and company
returned to power in 1972. [Ref. 2, p 152]
* Deng Xiaoping was the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and,
"Viewed China's destiny to be dependent upon more intellectual freedom and human or cultural
rights; de-emphasizing domestic and foreign class struggle; improving the economy by
adopting 'capitalist' wage and material incentive programs; imitating or borrowing from
foreign technology; creating a strong and effective collective-leadership system rather than
relying on an individual dictatorship; and stressing the development of a modem military
force." [Ref. 1, p. 235] Deng also favored the improvement of China's navy and merchant fleet
by purchase or charter. He felt that, "Unless China modestly copied foreign designs and
production techniques, any large-st ale maritime building program was unattainable." [Ref. 1, p
237]
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On 21 February 1972, President Richard M. Nixon made history and
changed the tide of US-PRC relations, by merely stepping onto Chinese soil.
Prior to Nixon meeting Zhou Enlai, the US had embargoed all trade with
China and had worked to exclude it from the United Nations. Harry Harding
states in A Fragile Relationship that,
The arrival of the president of the United States acknowledged the
failure of that strategy and thus was a vindication of Zhou, his
government, and the entire Chinese Communist movement. [Ref. 6, p 3]
The common interest that was most responsible for bringing these two
leaders together was their apprehension about the Soviet Union. Harding
recalls the circumstances that motivated a rapprochement between the US
and China as follows.
At a maximum, the two countries could find ways of coordinating
their strategic postures, or even pooling some of their military assets, in a
united front against Soviet expansion. At a minimum, ending the Sino-
American confrontation would mean that neither the United States nor
China would have to be worried about a two-front war. Instead, that
burden would be shifted to their adversaries in the Kremlin. [Ref. 6, p 4]
While neither Mao nor Zhou envisioned making China part of the
world economy, they both felt that closer relations, including economic and
cultural ties, with the United States would be necessary to bring China
completely out of the self-imposed isolation of the Cultural Revolution. An
improved relationship with the United States would have important security
implications as well; it would be a prerequisite for the purchase of advanced
American technology and would facilitate the import of similar technology
from American allies in Western Europe and Japan. [Ref. 6, p 4]
Technologies that would be necessary if China was to have the navy they
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apparently desired. China also hoped for a sharp overhaul of the COCOM
regulations.
A new phase in Chinese naval development began in May 1975, when
Party Chairman Mao Zedong convened a meeting of the Central Military
Commission. On his agenda was a "crash program" directed at the
modernization and development of the PRC Navy. In 1975 a plan was
approved and called for,
The development of an ocean going navy, able to meet superpower
adversaries on equal terms and to pursue regional, political, and economic
interests effectively. [Ref. 2, p 154]
Mao authorized this program of major naval modernization for two
reasons. First, China's political authorities had made peace with their
primary, potential, maritime enemy, the United States, and second, was in
direct response to the growing Soviet Pacific naval threat. Beyond was the
specter of Japan, which was in Chinese eyes the proxy of the United States.
The Chinese could neither understand nor accept the US-Japanese security
connection. This began to be exposed as the real cause for the Chinese push
for its naval expansion.
In 1975 Mao endorsed the new naval plan but it was not until late 1976,
after the purge of the Gang of Four, that technical and operational
modernization actually occurred. In the later half of the 1970s, the PRC Navy
finally made its first move into "blue water" and began to realize its potential
as a key player in the strategic situation in East and Southeast Asia.
* COCOM regulations: The Coordinating Committee for multi-lateral export controls
was established in 1949 and still serves to control the export of strategic technology and goods
from member countries (NATO allies, minus Iceland, plus Japan) to specified countries - namely
countries which support communist ideologies.
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With the death of Mao in 1976, and the resulting purge of the radicals
that surrounded him (the Gang of Four), naval strategic thought began to
contain elements of sea denial, sea control, power projection ashore and
afloat, and strategic deterrence. The navy's traditional coastal defense
mission was redefined and China looked to modern naval warfare on the
high sea..
In the post-Mao period, China described its ambitions for a powerful
navy. Renmin Ribao expressed this sentiment with the following statement:
The revolutionary spirit.., for the building of a powerful navy - long
repressed by the Gang of Four - has erupted like a volcano. . . . The
commanders and fighter-, again revised their plans and measures for the
building of a powerful navy .... The scientific research personnel who
were once suppressed by the Gang of Four brought out the blueprints then
had previously drawn, conducted research day and night, and trial-made
new devices. In just a few months, many units completed the training
which they had not carried out for many years in the past. Their tactical
and technical levels were raised considerably. The tempo of construction
for certain projects that had been obstructed and sabotaged by the Gang of
Four was accelerated. [Ref. 2, p 158]
After China normalized relations with the United States, the PRC
Navy began to take up its natural role in the Asia-Pacific by becoming the
strongest tool in support of its foreign policy. It was the reassessment of the
American factor - the zigs and the zags in relations with the United States -
that would basically influence the exponential growth in the strength of
China's drive toward a blue water navy.
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V. NAVAL REFORM AND MODERNIZATION: 1976-1989
By far the most important event of this period was the establishment of
formal diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the
United States in January 1979. The accomplishments and deficiencies of the
PRC Navy, the onset of US-PRC strategic cooperation, and China's economic
reforms, each contained a natural maritime component that was strongly
influenced by the American factor and had a significant impact on China's
naval development and maritime doctrine.
As previously stated Mao Zedong died in September 1976, and
immediately thereafter the Gang of Four was arrested and a long-term purge
of the leftist radicals from Chinese ruling circles began. The purge of the
radicals opened the way for the naval modernization program adopted in
1975. [Ref 2, p 158]
Under the new program, construction began on the types of ships that
would be necessary if Chinese naval operations were to take them into distant
waters. The most important of the open-ocean, operational support vessels
which began construction in the late 1970s, was the underway replenishment
ship (AOR), called the Fuqing class. Perhaps of greater interest to China's
neighbors, the construction of a new class of amphibious landing ship began
production in 1977 and was produced at a rate of four per year until the mid
1980s. Finally, of equal or even greater importance in these first attempts to
build an ocean going (blue water) navy, efforts to develop a nuclear powered
submarine intensified, and the first of the class was launched in 1981.
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The construction programs of this period were significant because these
new naval platforms were China's first attempt at building vessels designed
to be offensive in nature. However, by superpower standards, the Chinese
naval craft produced during this period were comparable in sophistication to
the effort of the 1950s in the United States. Muller states,
In terms of modern weaponry - guided missiles, electronics, computers,
antisubmarine sensors and weapons, and gas turbine power plants - China
was furiously building an obsolete navy. [Ref. 2, p 159]
While the post-Mao leadership appeared committed to a long-term
naval strengthening program, China's continued problems in (naval)
modernization stemmed from two root causes, technological backwardness
and a modest industrial base. [Ref. 7, p 238] Edward W. Ross stated that two
main obstacles impeded the transformation of military acquisitions into
actual military capabilities.
First, reduced foreign exchange reserves, coupled with the relatively
low priority assigned to defense modernization, meant that China could
not afford to purchase technology and equipment in sufficient quantities
to effect a near-term, across-the-board upgrade of its military capabilities.
Second, because China's military industrial plant and equipment, along
with its doctrine, strategy, and tactics, were in most respects distinctly
outdated... [Ref. 16, p 98]
A. NAVAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND DEFICIENCIES
Accomplishments. Among the dramatic events following China's
normalized relations with the United States in 1978, China signed the Treaty
of Peace and Friendship with Japan and two years later let the 1950 treaty of
mutual defense with the USSR lapse without any attempt to renew it.
The international balance of power during this period took a serious
turn for the worse as far as Moscow was concerned. The United States, China,
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and Japan appeared to be forming a de facto understanding to counter the
USSR in Asia. Zhou Enlai s policy of detente with the United States was
paying off unexpected military (naval) dividends for Beijing. The United
States did not object to its NATO allies negotiating arms sales with China.
Washington provided commnunications equipment, computers, and radar
equipment, which all had military applications. In early 1980, Defense
Secretary Brown offered to sell Beijing a variety of "non le"',al" military
equipment. Clearly, Washington was "playing the China card." [Ref. 7, p 236]
A dramatic shift occurred in the East Asian balance of power when the
Uniteu States agreed to sell weapons to China in 1981. This placed the USSR
at an alarming strategic disadvantage because of the more "maritime-
oriented" China. According to Bruce Swanson,
"..[China] elevated herself to second place on the [Soviet] threat list,
making China equal to Europe (the United States obviously remains first).
With increasing frequency, the Soviet Union has expressed concern over
the rapid buildup of the PRC navy and its potential for conducting naval
operations in the broader ocean areas. [Ref. 1, p 274]
In response to Sino-American (naval) cooperation, the Soviets began to
strengthen their Pacific Fleet and establish a naval presence in the South
China Sea. If making second place on the Soviet threat list can be considered
an accomplishment, then it is safe to say that China's success in turning the
nation seaward was also a significant achievement in naval terms. Other
naval accomplishments included:
1. By 1978, in terms of numbers of major combatants, the PRC navy
was the third largest in the world. [This is also true in 1993.] China
had more than 200 missile craft and its surface to surface missiles
(SSMs) out numbered those of the United States. [Ref. 1, p 276]
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2. By 1978, China possessed more than 100 conventional submarines,
capable of interdiction as far away as the Straits of Malacca or the
Philippine Sea. [Ref. 1, p 276]
3. China's newer missile equipped destroyers and frigates lhad ranges of
2,500 - 4,000 nautical miles for regional oceangoing operations, each
had an implemented gear-turbine propulsion systems. [Ref. 8, p 96]
4. The Chinese successfully launched their first nuclear powered
submarine, demonstrating competence in naval engineering and
sophisticated propulsion systems. [Ref. 1, p 276]
5. In the spring of 1980 China successfully tested its first inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM). [Ref. 1, p 277]
6. A reemphasis in professionalism and training began throughout the
navy. As an example, the PRC navy's submarine school added
courses in operational research, military science and technology,
English, and underwater survival techniques in 1981. [Ref. 1, p 277]
Deficiencies. Despite the many naval accomplishments of the period,
China remained hindered by technology and was largely preoccupied with
coastal defense. Deficiencies existed in China's weapons systems, electronics,
warships and aircraft, and manpower, training and shore facilities. For
example:
1. Weapons Systems. By 1980, China's one operational submarine
(launched in 1974) encountered severe technical problems. It was
readily known that China was apparently unable to develop a
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and had failed to date,
to develop a reliable (surface launched) missile system for its
submarines. [Ref. 1, p 278]
2. Electronics. China's best efforts by the early 1980s had fail, ' to
develop any unique ship-borne electronics. They relied u.. reverse
engineering to produce electronics of Western or Soviet design.
Most of the ship-board radar were developed by the Soviets 15 years
earlier and like the rest of the PLAN's electronics were less effective
than those of the modern systems used by their potential
adversaries. [Ref. 1, p 278]
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3. Warships and Aircraft. By the early 1980s, Chinese minesweepers
were obsolete by Western standards, most of China's amphibious
ships were old and inadequate to support a major offensive even as
close as against the Nationalist held islands. China's naval air arm
had about 700 obsolete aircraft, including 150 IL-28s, BE-6s, and TU-
2s. However, China did possess a substantial number of the more
modern MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-19 interceptors, but none of
them had an all-weather, or antisubmarine-warfare, capability. [Ref.
1, p 278]
4. Manpower, Training, and Shore Establishments. Manpower figures
during this period indicated that China's naval air arm only
employed 200,000 officers and enlisted men. The PRC navy
followed a practice of permanently assigning personnel to the same
billet. A ships commanding officer for example, was expected to
serve in that position for up to ten years. Tactics were kept at
primitive levels, with emphasis on coastal defense rather than
longer-range, sea denial tasks. The naval school system still
suffered from the fallout of the Cultural Revolution and was highly
decentralized and lacking unity of instruction. Shore establishment
weaknesses lied in the Beijing Navy Headquarters, where
ceremonial duties took priority over operational functions.
Furthermore, the navy was responsible for a number of non-
military duties like guarding offshore oil rigs and laying civil-
communications cable. [Ref. 1, p 279]
While these deficiencies (and accomplishments) were significant,
because of the detente with the United States, the PRC was now able to
conduct naval diplomacy with the powers of the West. These diplomatic
missi,.,ns were designed to familiarize Chinese naval personnel with the new
technologies and weapons systems of the United States and Europe. Since
1976, China has hosted a number of European naval delegations and Chinese
naval officers have traveled abroad to view Western naval installations. In
1979, for example, a PRC naval group went to England where they visited
Portsmouth, Davenport, and Gosport naval facilities, the Royal Naval
College, and various Royal Navy ships. In early 1980, Vice-premier Geng
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Biao went to the United States to look over American naval bases and during
the visit he took a short cruise aboard the US aircraft carrier Ranger.
While the PRC was highly interested in the technologies and ships of
the West, the Chinese naval visits were restricted to "window shopping."
The great cost of Western equipment was the main reason why the Chinese
did not make any large scale purchases abroad. [Ref. 1, p 281] However, after
more than 25 years of isolation from the navies of the West, Chinese naval
leaders were at last exposed to the thinking and resources of their newly-
acquired Western counterparts. Chinese technicians were given access to
foreign naval technology, and political relations were thereby enhanced. [Ref.
2, p 223]
B. US-PRC STRATEGIC COOPERATION
American officials in the mid-1980s saw a complex rationale for
expanding a military relationship with China. On a larger scale and possibly
of greater importance, a strategic relationship with China was regarded as an
important way of strengthening American ties with the PRC as a whole.
China's military and government leadership however, not willing to commit
to a "comprehensive security relationship" with the United States, feared
entanglement in a possible Soviet-American confrontation.
China's apprehensions over a comprehensive security relationship did
not preclude limited military cooperation. Sino-American security relations
developed along four dimensions in the mid-1980s. According to Harry
Harding,
The first (dimension) involved high-level consultations among
military and civilian officials from the two countries. ...Second, China and
the United States continued to share intelligence on Soviet military
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capabilities. ... .The third dimension of Sino-American strategic
cooperation involved the expansion of working-level exchanges between
the two military establishments ... Finally, the most controversial element
of Sino-American military cooperation was the program of American
arms sales to China. [Ref. 6, pp 165-1671
China's motivation for closer military relations with the United States
sprang from a desire to obtain the technology needed for a military
modernization consistent with its own long-term strategic goals of
establishing the PRC as a world power. [Ref. 16, p 86]
While China wanted to acquire American technology so that it could
manufacture its own equipment, the United States only wanted to sell
finished products to China to minimize the diversion of its technology and to
maximize corporate earnings. Because of these conflicting desires, few sales
had actually taken place prior to 1984.
In 1984, the United States made it possible for China to purchase
American weapons directly through the US government under the auspices
of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), thus allowing access to official (government)
financing. In the next several years the United States and China made several
agreements on arms sales and technology transfers. The only major naval
component of these agreements was designed to strengthen China's
antisubmarine capabilities. The United States and China agreed to coproduce
an antisubmarine torpedo' capable of being launched by surface vessels.
American commercial sales to China in the naval realm included S-70C
helicopters, LM2500 gas turbine engines for naval ships, coastal defense radar,
and communications equipment. [Ref. 16, p 93] On a larger scale, these
* This torpedo was the lightweight Mk. 46 Mod. 2 surface launched (over-the-side)
torpedo. [Ref. 16, p 961
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programs accounted for a rapid increase in American arms deliveries to
China, from $8.0 million in fiscal year 1984 to $106.2 million in fiscal year
1989.* [Ref. 6, p 168]
By 1985, four mission areas had been agreed to by the US Secretary of
Defense to focus Sino-American cooperative military activities: antitank
warfare, artillery and artillery defense, air defense, and the only naval
compromise, antisubmarine warfare. These four areas were meant to be
clearly defensive in nature. Furthermore, the United States made it clear that
it would not cooperate in six other major mission areas (primarily offensive
in nature): nuclear weapons and the systems for delivering them, electronic
warfare, surface ship antisubmarine warfare, intelligence, power projection,
and air superiority. [Ref. 6, p 167]
As the strategic relationship between the United States and China
expanded, American military analysts began to propose additional avenues
for military cooperation with China. These proposals were significant
because they reflected the mood of the middle to late -1980s. In the words of
Harry Harding,
...(There was) a sense that Sino-American relations had not yet realized
their full potential and that the main task of analysis was to identify the
possibilities for further cooperation. [Ref. 6, p 169]
By late 1988 the prospects for continued Sino-American relations were
uncertain at best. Despite the diffusion of the Taiwan issue, both China and
the United States were becoming less confident in the stability of Sino-
American relations. With the disintegration of communism in the Soviet
Union, the common bond, "anti-Soviet rationale," was rapidly being
See table, following page: US Military Sales to China, 1972-1990. [Ref. 6, p 371]
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Source, A Fragile Relationship, p 371
U.S. Military Sales to China, 1972-90
Thousands of current U.S. dollars
Commercial
Commercial deliveries
Fiscal FMS export plus FMS FMS Total
year agreements deliveries agreements deliveries deliveries
1972 ... 4 4 ... 4
1973 ... 0 0 ... 0
1974 ... 0 0 ... 0
1975 ... 0 0 ... 0
1976 ... 0 0 ... 0
1977 ... 1,023 1,023 1,023
1978 ... 0 0 0
1979 ... 0 0 ... 0
1980 ... 622 622 ... 622
1981 ... 0 0 0
1982 ... 1,000 1,000 .. 1,000
1983 ... 209 209 ... 209
19841 629 8,037 8,666 6 8,043
1985 421 46,247 46,668 424 46,671
1986 36,069 55,243 91,312 547 55,790
1987 254,289 33,933 288,222 3,881 37,814
1988 14,129 48,891 63,020 39,122 88,013
1989 416 16,415 16,831 89,800 106,215
1990 0 3,615 3,615 0 3,615
Sourcea: Fat each year, We Secunty Assistance Agewacy, Ftwegns Military Sales. Forngn Military Constauction
Sales and Military Assistance Facts IWubmngton: Depanrmeat at De1easel. Because ach ye•a,' pubiration
plones an update oa the piwvaoua ten yeams, co=sut the ast-c teat yeabook that cantains the year in qugstwn
S banhe mat accuuate A7
a. Ch=n wa MWO cho~e for the ihemp, milizary sasi IIPMSI proagam in 1984.
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removed. It became increasingly apparent that the Sino-American
relationship now rested on the fate of reform in China. [Ref. 6, p 174]
C. ECONOMIC REFORM: THE NATURAL MARITIME COMPONENT
It is clear that in the 1970s, China laid the foundations for its growth as
a naval and maritime power. As the PRC Navy (PLAN) abandoned its
limited coastal defense mentality it no longer saw itself as simply a coastal
patrol and counter-invasionary force. The Chinese navy was preparing for
independent operations in waters dista' from the Chinese coast while
actively promoting and protecting China's iritime interests in the Western
Pacific region.
In 1975, the PLAN embarked on a long term effort to modernize the
concepts and methods governing its strategic employment. By 1983, the PRC
Navy physically looked quite similar to the way it was in 1975 but, it was in
fact very different as it had learned to think differently about itself and its
missions. It was indeed on the verge of great expansion. [Ref. 2, p 224]
China's "opening up" to the outside world had its origins in the
political leadership of the Communist Party, primarily in response to
economic circumstances rather than out of history or ideology. Deng
Xiaoping and his party decided in 1978 that foreign interests, specifically
multinational capitalist corporations, could play a significant and
constructive role in the long term development of the PRC, and indeed in the
"Chinese form of socialism."
In 1978 China began a long term program of economic reforms. The
authorities moved to enhance freedom of choice and the decision-making
process so as to strengthen the role of market forces and gradually remove
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centralized administrative controls. Reforms were aimed at increasing the
flexibility of the system and at introducing some basic elements of the free
market so that China would be better equipped to compete in the
international environment.
The new open door for trade and investment got spectacular though
mixed results. The great enthusiasms for contracting foreign loans to
develop China's resources and industries after 1978 led at first to a great
overexpansion and then to a bust. Grandiose plans and large contracts
with Japanese, US, and European firms had to be scaled back. [Ref. 34, p
980]
China's emphasis on reform in the economic sphere produced a
number of dramatic changes, the most significant one being the replacement
of the Soviet economic model with a system closely resembling a capitalist
economy. For example, China joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank in 1980. By 1981, China had the largest quota among
developing nations by obtaining loans totaling nearly $1 billion. [Ref. 9)
China's economic interests in the maritime sphere underwent a
dramatic change after the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention legitimized the
concept of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The EEZs that extend 200 miles
from a nation s coastline contain overlapping definitions of the continental
shelf and have encouraged states to be more assertive in pressing their claims
to the sea territory. The single largest Chinese assertion was (and still is) the
Spratly Island dispute in the South China Sea. The PRC, Vietnam, Taiwan,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei each had claim to all or part of the
Spratly archipelago.*
* The Spratly Island dispute is still a sticky point of contention between these
countries. The six parties in the Spratly dispute base their claims on disparate justifications of
sovereignty. A key point is that the overriding motive is each case is to reserve or preserve a
political position in the South China Sea. A resolution of the Spratly dispute rests not on the
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A sizable merchant marine fleet and the offshore oil industry
developed because the national leadership saw them as essential to China's
economic growth. Clearly the development of China as a naval power was,
and still is, essential for the protection and promotion of these maritime
economic interests. Oil companies, most of them American, have spent over
$3.2 billion looking for and processing oil in China's territorial waters since
1982. [Ref. 11]
By 1983, China's maritime strategic interests were very much in line
with its maritime economic interests. Offshore oil and development of the
vast continental shelf, coupled with a vulnerable merchant marine fleet,
which was effectively and efficiently providing for secure transport of China's
goods essential for foreign trade, provided the motivation for protection of
China's maritime interests.
Historically, one does not have to look too far back to see how
frequently naval power has been used in areas of crises or to simply send
messages of resolve, concern and or support. The PRC had on numerous
occasions used the movement of ground and air forces along the borders with
the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam, or in the Taiwan Strait, to
demonstrate its concerns. Bv the mid 1980s, the PRC Navy had experimented
with modern naval diplomacy and had deployed to waters off Japan,
Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. [Ref. 2, p 227]
By the late 1980s, China had established the Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) along the coast. These zones included the cities by the sea that
legitimacy of each state's claim but instead on the ability of the claimants to reach an
acceptable solution within the larger political, military and economic context of the region.
[Ref. 15, p 31
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collectively accounted for over 70% of China's GDP, [Ref. 12] and were
considered central to China's continued economic growth and export trade.
These cities and their natural sea lanes of trade and communication have
since been viewed as essential to China's national security and thus China's
maritime strategy.
To set up conditions that would attract foreign investors the PRC next
created four Special Economic Zones, the most prominent of which was
Shenzhen, next door to Hong Kong. Within such zones foreign investors
were given special facilities for a foreign lifestyle while undertaking joint
ventures with their Chinese counterparts. The zones were set apart form
the Chinese economy in general. Along with them went the opening of
fourteen ports specially suited to foreign trade - a bit reminiscent of the
nineteenth-century treaty, ports, though now China, not the foreigners,
called the tune. [Ref. 34, p 980]
Also in the late 1980s, the discovery of natural gas and oil reserves,
estimated to be worth over 51 trillion in the East and South China Seas, gave
easy justification for increased naval modernization. [Ref. 13] Protection of
this huge potential-source of national income in the maritime territories
claimed by China was seen as an essential role for the PLAN.
While the Chinese navy had come a long way in its first 40 years of
existence, the PRC was beginning to "open up" to the outside world
economically and relations with the United States had greatly enhanced
China's position as a regional naval power. However, the Sino-American
relationship was about to take a serious turn for the worse in June of 1989
after the events of Tiananmen Square shocked the world.
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VI. AFTER THE COLD WAR: 1989-1993
The political crisis in China that developed in the middle of 1989
suddenly and drastically transformed Sino-American relations. For many
Americans, the sight of troops in Tiananmen Square seriously limited any
hopes that China would soon be adopting American values or emulating
American institutions. The appearance of an unstable central government
made China a much less attractive place for American investment,
scholarship, or tourism. Following the June 4th incident, the American press
coupled with the sanctions imposed on China by the US Congress, and the
congressional promise for further retaliation, convinced the Chinese that the
United States was engaged in a program of "peaceful evolution" aimed
ultimately at the overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party. [Ref. 6, p 11]
Changes in the international environment in the late 1980s and early
1990s, only intensified the impact of China's domestic crisis on Sino-
American relations. The collapse of communism, first in Eastern Europe and
then in the Soviet Union, only stood to reinforce the American tendency to
perceive Beijing as a ruthless government. The collapse of communism in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe further intensified Chinese concerns
about the future of their relationship with the United States.
The ease at which the American military defeated Iraq in early 1991,
and the equally startling disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern
Europe, left the United States the world's only remaining military
superpower. In Chinese eves, this threatened to create a unipolar world
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centered on Washington and increased the odds that the United States would
embark on a policy of peaceful evolution aimed at Communist China.
As China developed its power projection capability through the PLAN
after the Tiananmen Square incident, unresolved territorial claims in the East
and South China Seas led to a more assertive political and diplomatic posture
in Asia. The changing balance of power throughout the world, and China's
growing economic clout, strengthened China's resolve. Since 1989, all of
China's leaders have recognized the importance of economic growth and
individual prosperity to the nation's stability.
The aggressive role of China has exacerbated the tensions over the
Spratlys. Not only are the islands rich in natural resources but in an
intangible way, China after 1989 looked to increase its influence in the region.
The PLAN had seized some islets from the Vietnamese and in doing so
demonstrated a willingness to use its growing naval capability to show its
resolve over the islands. A relatively modern Chinese navy enabled China to
accomplish its objectives in the Spratlys and further its economic interests
while at the same time projecting its political presence into the South China
Sea.
A decided change in China's strategic (naval) and regional outlook
occurred in 1992 when the US Navy pulled out of Subic Bay. With the
American Navy no longer in the Philippines and the threat from the former
Soviet naval fleet significantly reduced, China moved to increase its presence
and prestige in the Western Pacific. China's expansion was designed to
enhance its position in the region while giving it a more significant role in
shaping any regional security arrangements. With China's navy as its
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military muscle, the PRC moved to strengthen its economic and security
structure on the entire Pacific rim.
Concerns about maritime (and on a larger scale, military) security in
East Asia have if anything increased since the end of the Cold War. China's
rapid military (and naval) buildup is supplemented by a fear that the United
States will not be willing to act as a "regional balancer" for an indefinite
period of time. An American draw-down and the potential for a US
withdrawal (even if it is far fetched, it is a regional concern) from the region
raises fears of a Japan once more on the march or the possibility of a
threatening, nuclear armed, North Korea.
As proof that these fears were (and still are) real, the annual defense
expenditures in East Asia rose dramatically from 1985 to 1991. Japan's
military spending increased 15.6%; North Korea's spending increased by
15.8%; South Korea's by 27.8%; Taiwan's by 24.6%; Thailand's by 12.1%;
Malaysia by 23.4%; the Philippines' by 42.9%; and China by a dramatic 60.1%.
[Ref. 18, p 139)
A. THE IMPACT OF TIANANMEN SQUARE
The 1989 "pro-democracy" movement, China's most dramatic
nationwide protest movement, reached its tragic climax on 4 June 1989 in
Tiananmen Square. The incident at Tiananmen Square was a spontaneous
uprising of not only students but, workers and ordinary citizens, a few party
and government officials, leading journalists, and top "think-tank"
entrepreneurs. On the night of 3-4 June, following two full weeks of martial
law, enough troops had been assembled around Beijing to permit the final
suppression of the demonstrations. The responsible soldiers were from the
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regular army, equipped with tanks and automatic weapons rather than water
cannon and tear gas, and neither adequately trained nor skillfully led in the
suppression of urban protests. Perhaps provoked by occasional outbreaks of
violence from the crowd, they open fired at random on demonstrators at the
approaches to the center of Beijing, and steadily moved forward to retake
Tiananmen Square. Although the casualty figures remain uncertain, the
most common estimates indicated that a thousand demonstrators died and
several thousands more were injured in that night's military crackdown.
The initial impact of the brutal crackdown on, and political oppression
of, the pro-democracy movement by the PLA occasioned a show of worldwide
outrage. The United States. Canada, and most Western European countries
immediately imposed economic sanctions against China. Angry Western
governments delayed or restricted loans to Beijing. China's major source of
interest-free and low interest loans, The World Bank, under American and
Western European pressure, suspended $780 million in new loans. Business
people from America, Japain and Western Europe left China and threatened
not to return.
The Bush administration announced several sanctions against the
Chinese government, in an attempt to balance the preservation of diplomatic
relations and express the outrage of some American people. These limited
sanctions included:
Suspensions of both government and commercial exports of weapons,
and suspension of military exchange visits between the US and the PRC.
In addition, the president said that there would be a sympathetic
evaluation of requests by Chinese students in the US for extension of their
visas, medical assistance through the International Red Cross for persons
injured in the military crackdown, and a reevaluation of other aspects of
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Sino-US relations in line with development of events in the PRC. [Ref.
14, p 142]
The United States Congress went even further by suspending military
contacts, trade and development programs, banning the sale of police
equipment, and limiting the transfer of high-tech and nuclear material and
components to China. Almost overnight China suffered unprecedented
military, economic, and diplomatic setbacks. For many Am <icans, when
relations with China (military or otherwise) are discussed, the images from
the Cable News Network (CNN) at Tiananmen Square that night in early
June, still come to mind.
B. AFTER THE GULF WAR: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY
Since the late 1980s, and the collapse of the Soviet Urion, Chinese
leaders and military analysts have attempted to identify some other (other
than China's human rights record) international problems that could provide
a new strategic basis for US-China relations, and that might once again
persuade Americans to play down their ideological differences with China.
Through the end of 1990, many Chinese still hoped that the perceived threat
of the Soviet Union would serve that function. [Ref. 6, p 269]
When the Bush administration announced that it would seek United
Nations (UN) sanctions against Iraq, as part of its effort to build a "new world
order," China's veto power cn the Security Council immediately made
Beijing an important consideration in American strategy.
The Gulf crises provided a telling indication of Pacific Asia's
dependence on outside powers and its peripheral political status.
Virtually the entire Pacific Asian region - recipient of more than half of all
the Middle East's oil - remained largely a spectator to the political
initiatives and the land and sea actions of Western nations in the Gulf.
Many Pacific Asians viewed the Western military retaliation against Iraq's
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invasion of Kuwait to be unnecessary. ...China abstained on the UN
Security Council vote that permitted military force to be used against Iraq.
These are telling indicators of significant political and cultural gulfs that
remain between Pacific Asia and the West. [Ref. 17, p 5321
China's abstention in the UN Security Council was in a large way due
to two major concerns: its desire to maintain most favored nation (MFN)
trading status with the United States, and to increase its prestige as a player in
the international community. It also hoped for a renewal of American
military cooperation. Had China exercised its veto power in the Security
Council, it would have surely suffered the loss of MFN status and would
have succeeded in further driving the already existing wedge between the
military powers of the West (most importantly the United States) and the
PLAN.
The largest impact of the 1990-1991 Gulf War has been to confirm
Beijing's belief in the power of high-tech weapons and equipment. China's
future in the international technology trade will depend heavily on new
foreign investments and information. This technology and foreign
investment will be necessary if the Chinese people are to build the powerful
People's Navy of their dreams.
The Chinese belief that American military intervention in Iraq was
both unnecessary and unwise was strengthened as they realized that the US
had not totally succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussien nor in solving all
the problems of the region. Gradually they reasoned that the American
juggernaut was less ominous than they had originally feared. [Ref. 6, p 274]
Consequently, they became more relaxed and more confident in themselves
as they dealt with the Americans.
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Chinese leaders concluded that cooperation on international issues
would maximize China's diplomatic leverage and maneuverability. The
developments in the Persian Gulf led the Chinese to make some general
adjustments in that direction.
China now focused on improving relations with its Asian neighbors.
It stopped its criticism of Gorbachev's economic and political reforms and
continued to expand diplomatic, economic, and military relations with
Moscow. Peking muted its criticism of the Japanese defense policy, even
when Tokyo dispatched a flotilla of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf...
While still eschewing formal diplomatic relations with Seoul, it agreed,
over Pyongyang's objections, to the simultaneous admission of both
Koreas to the United Nations. And there were continuing signs of
improvement in China's relation with Vietnam, even before the
successful conclusion of the negotiations on Cambodia. All these steps
suggested that Peking was attempting to reduce tensions with the rest of
Asia to gain the diplomatic leverage to deal with the United States from as
advantageous a position as possible. [Ref. 6, p 275]
While all of this diplomatic posturing was im'ortant to China's
standing in the international community, the impact of technology on the
decisive, American led coalition, victory over Iraq had left its mark. The
overwhelming success of Western technology in the Gulf War confirmed to
the leadership in Beijing that military modernization needed to be advanced
and that increased defense spending would be necessary if China was to be a
competitive military (naval) power. In the words of Dr. David Winterford,
Although the current Chinese defense buildup predates the Gulf War,
the decisive victory by the United States and its coalition partners
pointedly and painfull) illustrated the backwardness of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) and its general lack of preparedness to fight high
technology warfare. The leadership has reacted with a mixture of envy
and dismay to the stunning use of advanced technology by the United
States in the Gulf War. One of the most telling lessons of that war drawn
by Beijing was that superiority in numbers maters little against quality of
weapons and forces. In other words, the Gulf War demonstrated to
Chinese strategists their wisdom in jettisoning several years ago much of
88
the fundamental principles of Maoist military theory, the people's war.
[Ref. 10, p 5]
Since the end of the Gulf War, Chinese leaders have placed a new
emphasis on developing state of the art technology and seem to have
concluded that military science and technology constitute essential
components of national power. [Ref. 19] The 1990-1991 defense expenditures
had been increased by 15.5%. [Ref. 21] The PLAN again increased its defense
spending in 1991-1992 by 13.8%, over the previous year. [Ref. 20] Both of these
rather large increases can be attributed to the military lessons of the Gulf War.
In addition to these military spending increases the PLAN has substantial
additional funds from China's booming arms exports. [Ref. 22] Furthermore,
reports indicated that the PLAN military commanders had been promised
double-digit annual increases through 1995. [Ref. 23] This substantial
increase in defense spending will certainly produce a positive effect on the
Chinese navy but it cannot achieve the ultimate combat capability that the
government has set as its goal.
C. THE PRC NAVY IN 1993
As previously stated, China has spent close to $2 billion on imports of
modern equipment and weapons since mid-1989. The 1991 increase in the
military budget followed a 15% rise in 1990, and sources expect continued
defense budget to increases of about 10% each year for at least the next four
years. [Ref. 26, p 37] The actual figures are peanuts in the light of modern
costs. Much remains to be done particularly in providing weapons and
sensors effective in modern warfare, this was never more evident than after
the Gulf War. While progress has been slow, nuclear powered submarines
continue to receive top priority in China's naval circles. Only one nuclear
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powered submarine with ballistic missile capabilities (SSBN) is currently in
service, while nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs) are being launched
at the rate of one every three years. Although the diesel electric submarine
force remains over 80% obsolete, this potential force should not be
underestimated.
In an effort to improve its ability to project power into the South and
East China Seas, China has been seeking to upgrade both its Air Force and its
Navy. Since 1991, China has purchased 24 sophisticated SU-27 fighters from
the former Soviet Union and is negotiating to purchase the MiG-31 aircraft.
[Ref. 35] The SU-27 is comparable to the American F-15 and is considered a
great leap forward from China's most advanced planes, its 1950s vintage F-8
fighters. The new planes will help China update its tactics and strategy and
give China an edge over Vietnam in any possible clash over the Spratly
Islands.
Construction of an airstrip on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands in
the South China Sea, has allowed forward basing of aircraft into the South
China Sea. Previously, Chinese planes flying to the Spratlys from Hainan
Province have been able to fly over the islands for just five to ten minutes
before having to turn back for refueling. Acquisition of air-to-air refueling
technology, reportedly from Iran, will greatly enhance air presence in the
region and allow the air force to provide air cover for naval operations over
greater distances in the South China Sea. [Ref. 26, p 38]
Modernization to extend naval operations beyond China's coastal
waters began with a short term effort to upgrade its anti-aircraft and ship-to-
ship missiles, improving anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and obtaining
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more ballistic missile submarines. The long-term goal has been to acquire an
aircraft carrier with the accompanying ships necessary to support such a battle
group. China is currently converting a ship to serve as a helicopter carrier,
and there have been consistent, unconfirmed, reports that it may bid for one
of two Soviet aircraft carriers under construction at Nikolayev on the Black
Sea.
The PLAN expects to rely primarily on the local ship-building industry
for a new generation of warships that soon will enter service. The current
priority is on the acquisition of destroyers, frigates and smaller patrol boats. A
longer-term objective is the procurement of a small aircraft carrier. In a
number of internal speeches throughout late 1992, military chiefs have
reiterated the need for China to buy or build an aircraft carrier. But lack of
funds is likely to delay a firm decision until the end of this decade. [Ref. 281
Construction of the I uda type destroyers (DDGs) continues while a
modernization program is currently underway using French technology.
New installations include Crotale air defense system (surface-to-air missile or
SAM) and modern fire control systems. New construction frigates are
acquiring modern surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and helicopters, but they
lack sufficient air defense weaponry. [Ref. 36]
Construction of new tank landing ships continues but only at a rate
sufficient to replace the older vessels. The existing amphibious force is
sufficient for operations against offshore islands and in such near by areas as
the Spratlys, but it is nowhere near sufficient for major power projection.
There are persistent reports of proposals to acquire a helicopter support
ship with STOVL (short take-off and vertical landing) combat aircraft
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capabilities. It remains to be seen whether this will materialize. In summary,
until China can complete her massive modernization task, China's very
numerous naval units will have to rely on sheer weight of numbers to
overcome their much more sophisticated neighbors including Japan, Russia,
and of course the United States.
Probably the most significant development of 1992-1993 was the
Chinese Navy's major exercise 3,000 nautical miles off the China coast. Other
naval accomplishments ,of the 1992-1993 time frame include the
modernization of a second Luda class destroyer and the commissioning of
four new helicopter equipped ships. Over the last four years, some 80
Lienyun coastal minesweepers have been built, and the naval air force is
credited with 50 additional Q-5 FGA (fighter ground attack) aircraft. [Ref. 25]
In summation, China's naval forces at the end of 1992 and early 1993
included the following: [Refs. 24 and 25]*
Personal: 260,000 total personal including 27,000 for coastal defense,
6,000 marines and 25,000 in the naval air force.
Submarines: 93 total
Strategic submarines: 1 SSBN
Tactical submarines: 92
SSN: 4 Han
SSG: 1 modified Romeo (Type ES5G)
SS: 87
3 improved Ming (Type ES5E)
84 Romeo (Type ES3B)




2 Ex-Soviet Gordy class
Frigates: 37
26 Jianghu with 4 different variations
For a detailed break-down of the entire PLA and Navy see: The Military Balance
Asia-Pacific region in the, Asian Dfence fournal, January 1993, pp 96-99.
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9 Type II ASW ships
2 Type III ASTT ships
Patrol and coastal combatants: approximately 915 total
Missile craft: 215
125 Huangfeng/Hola (Ex-Soviet Osa-Type
90 Hegu/Hema (Komar-Type)
Torpedo craft: approximately 160










Support and miscellaneous: approximately 136
Including 3 Icebreakers and 25 Ocean going tugs
Naval Air Forces: 840 shore based combat aircraft and 61 helicopters.
Bombers: 30 H-6 and 130 H-5
FGA: 100
Fighter: 600 including the J-5/6/7
ASW: 15 SA-321
Helicopters: 15 SA-321, 40 Z-5, 10 Z-9
Miscellaneous: 60 transport aircraft
Deployment and Bases:
North Sea Fleet: Responsible for coastal defense from the Korean
border (Yalu River) to just south of Lianyungang.
Bases: Qingdao (HQ), Dalian (Luda), Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan
and nine coastal defense districts.
Forces: 2 submarines, 3 escorts, 1 mine warfare, 1 amphibious
squadron and about 325 patrol and coastal combatants.
East Sea Fleet: Responsible for coastal defense from south of
Lianyungang to Dongshan.
Bases: Shanghai (HQ), Wusong, Dinghai, Hangzhou and seven
coastal districts.
Forces: 2 submarines, 2 escorts, 1 mine warfare, 1 amphibious
squadron, about 270 patrol and coastal combatants, with 1 marine cadre
division.
South Sea Fleet: Responsible for coastal defense from Dongshan to the
Vietnam border and seaward, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
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Bases: Zhanjiang (HQ), Shantou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin,
Beihai, Huangpu; plus outposts on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and
nine coastal defense districts.
Forces: 2 submarines, 2 escorts, 1 mine warfare, 1 amphibious
squadron and about 320 patrol and coastal combatants, with 1 marine
battalion.
China's People's Liberation Army/Navy (PLAN) is the largest naval
force in the Far East, but the quality of its equipment does not place it in the
front rank of Western style naval forces. The multi-service "peripheral
defense" concept adopted in the late 1980s (replacing the coastal "naval self-
defense" concept of the 1970s) is still being adhered to, with the level of
interest in long-range, blue water, exercises showing an increase over
previous years. [Ref. 27, p t231 The seaborne element (the navy) of China's
defense force has never been perceived as a high priority when it comes to
allocating funds. The navy has always been and will more than likely
continue to be the little brother, or junior service, to the PLA (Army).
Nevertheless, a drive is underway in China to build a blue water navy
that will give the PRC more muscle in Asia in the 21st century. Beijing's
explanation is that military muscle will help safeguard the nation's economic
development by guaranteeing domestic stability and safe borders. Viewed
from Beijing, the post-Cold War world remains a dangerous and uncertain
place. While the Soviet threat is all but gone, the United States still poses an
ideological challenge to the last communists.
As the Cold War gave way to a complex, evolving new world order,
the Chinese felt obliged to deal continuously with the American factor. It was
always the United States they perceived as their ultimate threat, and forced
them to spend as much as they did in building their crediblq fleet. They could
never consider entering any agreements on arms control - especially
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involving the Navy and the Air Force - without weighing the capabilities and
policies of the United States.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS: 1993 AND BEYOND
It has been clearly demonstrated in the course of this thesis that the
American factor has been at the heart of China's maritime doctrine. The
development of the Chinese navy and the evolution of China's maritime
doctrine have depended primarily upon the entire gamut of US - China
political, and diplomatic relations. This will continue to be true in the future.
This concluding chapter will not venture to predict either the future of the
Chinese navy or the future of China's maritime doctrine. It will however,
stress those highlights, in ciurrent international relations in East Asia and the
Western Pacific, which reinforce my conviction that the United States will
continue to be as influential on policy-making in China in the future, as it
has been in the past.
The Chinese share in the general opinion that the United States must
stay in force to ensure that a military vacuum is not created, one that others
might be tempted to fill. China's present program of military modernization
for example, could become a more destabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific
region were it not for the balance of the United States.
In general it is safe to say that the risk of naval conflict in the region is
quite low at least for now, but latent security fears still exist. China is
determined to see to it that its historical territorial waters remain under its
control. Beijing is preparing itself with the capability to show respectable
force in the region even if it risks alienating both Japan and the United States.
Alienation of these two great powers would however, have its economic and
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strategic implications, and therefore, China is likely to take great care in
pressing its claims in the East And South China Seas. All this is due to
China's recognition of the uverwhelming power of the United States Navy.
Another threat to regional peace that looms on the immediate horizon
is the potential for a Korean nuclear capability. North Korea's nuclear
program has caused a flurry of activity among the major nations seeking
stability and continued peace in the Northern Pacific. Bilateral and
multilateral arrangements of every kind are being considered to prevent the
outbreak of any type of military conflict. Whatever action China takes in this
troubling matter is bound to be conditioned by American official attitudes,
backed by the persuasive presence of American military power.
The American factor has always been and still is the major
determinant in the development of China's maritime doctrine, and on a
much larger scale, the development of China as an economic partner and
potential strategic adversary or ally. The United States is currently in a critical
position. Planners and strategists alike will have to consider how the United
States can best formulate policies of mutual benefit for China and itself. It is
fundamental that the United States remain actively engaged on all of the
issues concerning China from human rights to military doctrine and
development. One thing is for certain, if the United States is not there to
respond to China's needs, then some other Western country will fill in the
gap!
Trade with China should be encouraged, but appeasing Beijing on
moral or practical issues is wrong. America's China policy will always be
controversial, but basic organizing principles are possible. Washington
must strike a balance between confronting China and turning a blind eye.
The issues it objects to must be clear transgressions against universal
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moral principles or the demands of global stability. It must give Beijing an
incentive to reverse course. It was wise to continue China's most favored
nation trading status while continuing that the West wants long term
cooperation, but this requires China to moderate itself on select issues.
[Ref. 32]
A. US NAVAL PRESENCE IN EAST ASIA
East Asia now is the world's single most economically dynamic region.
According to World Bank figures, for example, the region's developing states,
excluding only Japan, averaged growth rates of 8.4% in the 1980s. This put
them far ahead of Latin America at 1.6%,, the Middle East and North Africa at
2.9%, and Western industrial countries at 3%. [Ref. 32]
Almost ironically, the region's economic vitality has generated certain
downsides. China's modernization, for example, while increasing trade
flows, has led to a stronger Chinese military and domestic tensions which
have alarmed their neighbors. A major conflict, or even an arms race, would
greatly destabilize the region economically and diplomatically. The United
States is, and must remain, the great balancer in this unstable but dynamic
environment. American presence in East Asia's markets is vital to its own
prosperity and will remain ,,o in the 21st century. At the start of the 1990s,
almost 40% of all US trade was with the Asia Pacific region. This trade totaled
some $300 billion, while trade with Europe amounted to $201 billion. [Ref. 32]
President Clinton has stated on many occasions that America's strategy
will be "to compete, not retreat." Stability in the region requires America to
show the flag. The fact that most East Asian nations want the US Navy to
remain in the Asian sealanes, provides evidence that America is considered a
trustworthy state. In stabilizing the region, the United States is also protecting
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its national economic interest. Brent Scowcroft, former national security
advisor to President George Bush, noted that,
Foreign trade ...is vital to America.. .foreign policy and domestic policy
have become two sides of the same coin. America must be a global leader
for altruistic reasons - but selfish reasons should (also) move us. [Ref. 321
America's policy of "containment" (of communism) has been replaced
by the objective of maintaining a stable balance of power among regional
states. This balance of power will prevent any one actor from establishing
regional hegemony, and it will deter or defend against the use of force for the
resolution of disagreements or crises. It will also prevent or at least dampen a
conventional and nuclear arms race which only stands to fuel suspicion in
the region. Forward deployed naval, air, and army bases are the very tools of
Washington's Asia policy. Many Asian states have in recent years expressed
concerns that the US might scale down its presence too far due to the collapse
of the USSR and America's many domestic problems.
The potential for expansion of the current naval rivalries in the Asia-
Pacific region is high. The question of continued US naval presence and
engagement in the region is very much in the mind of Asian naval
strategists, the least of which is certainly not the Chinese. Prior to the fall of
the former Soviet Union, the Cold War structure (bipolar) contributed to the
stability of the region. Today with the Russian Pacific Fleet, while still
capable, basically out of commission due to fiscal nstraints and deep morale
problems, the opportunity exists for other regional actors to take up some of
the slack and venture into the arena left vacant by the USSR and possibly,
eventually, by the United States. This may be evident in the recent
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military/naval buildup, sometimes referred to as an arms race, of the nations
in the region, including Malaysia, India, Taiwan, and of course, China.
Despite the end of the Cold War and the fact that the Russian naval
fleet will not likely be a threat to the region any time real soon, the situation
in the Asia-Pacific is not as stable as it could be. Many in the region and in the
United States argue that the Chinese have embarked on a new imperialist
phase. The justification for their beliefs lie in the South China Sea. China
has built naval and air bases in the Paracel Islands and has recently purchased
an aerial refueling capability from the Russians which allows their fighters
extended range into the disputed waters. Beijing has announced an
uncompromising claim to the entire Spratly archipelago and many Southeast
Asians wonder if this will stimulate the Americans to oppose what they label
as Chinese military expansionism.
The uncertainty in the region has been a hold over from the Cold War.
While the United States and the former Soviet Union are no longer at odds,
many countries in the region still remember the era of Japanese aggression
and today worry about the direction of China's military objectives. Making
matters worse, the recent American pullout form the Philippines has led to
uncertainty in the minds of many Asians as to the resolve of American
military presence in the region. Furthermore, a nuclear armed and politically
unstable North Korea only adds to the tensions of the day.
B. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
Today China is more comfortable with its security environment than it
has been since the founding of the PRC in 1949. The PRC does not face a
plausible external military threat to its heartland but it does however, have
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many on going disputes offshore. China's global position and leverage may
have been weakened by the end of the Cold War but one can not over look
China's position as a permanent member of the United Nation's Security
Council. With membership as one of the "big five," China maintains the
powerful veto option, and the US. and others should not take this too lightly.
China's position on security matters will have to be seriously considered as
long as the United States, in the name of collective security, is willing to act
under the auspices of the United Nations.
As in the past, today China supports a continued American naval
presence in the Western Pacific to counter any latent Japanese militarism,
which in China's opinion is the most obvious potential maritime threat. In
the meantime, Japan, while publicly downplaying any aspirations of
expansionist goals, is quietly developing one of the world's most modern
naval forces. Again from China's perspective, the possibility of renewed
Japanese imperialism cannot be simply dismissed. China has a long and
tainted history and the Chinese people have vivid memories of
infringements upon their sovereignty
China's history of exploitation by Western imperialist powers has had
a strong maritime component. England, France, Germany, and the United
States all arrived on the Chinese mainland from the sea. From my
prospective, that of a United States naval officer, given the current economic
(and to some degree military) interdependence it is difficult to conceive any
realistic maritime threat to the Chinese coast. From a Chinese prospective,*
* The author enjoyed an extensive one to one interview with Lcdr. Yang Zhi Qun at the
Center for International Relations and Arms Control at Stanford University's Galvez House on 8
September 1993. Yang provided the author with valuable insights on his ("the Chinese")
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however, Japan's potential maritime strength and America's often
ambivalent attitude toward China are of primary concern. Regardless, China
is bent on securing what is sees as its natural and historical sovereignty. This
is the Chinese justification for the high cost of modernizing its naval forces.
At stake in East Asia is the security of the major sealanes of trade and
communication, specifically in the South China Sea, where the Straits of
Malacca connect the Pacific and Indian Oceans. One only need look at a map
of the region to see the maritime implications should a security vacuum
develop. Such a vacuum might allow a potentially hegemonistic nation with
territorial aspirations the power to interfere with and even interdict upon
international shipping transiting the South China Sea.
It is time that analysts of maritime affairs consider the possible impact
of naval development, including the benefits of mutual cooperation, on
Asian security. This is the best way to prevent economic rivalry from spilling
over into military confrontation. Surely in this process, a substantial forward
deployment of American forces is a critical component.
1. Prospects For Multilateral Maritime Security
Asian collective security arrangements will have to take into
account the three major players in the region, the United States, Japan, and of
course, the PRC. A short list of a country's national interests, prioritizes
survival of the state, economic prosperity, and a stable and secure world. It is
safe to say that survival is in the forefront of every nation's concerns and that
economic prosperity may take a close second. But in the third position, a
perceptions of potential maritime threats in the region. Lcdr Yang is a researcher at the Naval
Research Institute of the PLA at China's Association for Military Science (CAMS) in Beijing.
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stable and secure world, is a necessary ingredient if the first two objectives are
to be safely met.
In the search for new collective security configurations in the Asia-
Pacific region there have been many initiatives emphasizing economic and
security concerns. The first is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Asia (CSCA), while not necessarily a maritime related forum, is based on
some of the same basic premises.
First, economic circumstances that can no longer sustain a US presence
and "policeman's role" in Asia as heretofore. Second, that the security
arrangements that had been basically in place for the past several decades
is now obsolete and that new alternatives are in order. Third, that existing
security arrangements are anachronistic in the post Cold War era,
especially now that the threats previously posed by China and the former
Soviet Union have to be viewed in a new light. [Ref. 29]
It is hoped that the CSCA will be able to persuade all of the
countries in the region to engage in discussions about security in a mutually
beneficial way. While the United States may want to spearhead such dialogue
in multilateral security alone, it may be easier to approach it via the second
initiative, the Asean Post Ministerial Conference. According to Zara Dian,
A lessening of the US role in bilateral defence links and forward
deployment suggests a corresponding increase in burden sharing of
security tasks among the countries of Pacific Asia, a development which is
not altogether a bad thing for the region since it will mean a spread of the
chore and responsibility on a more equitable basis. But Washington will
have to be very mindful that this will not be a signal of a weakening of its
regional role and political resolve. [Ref. 29]
Given the mood of most Americans, this premise of burden sharing
will go a long way in the hearts and minds of those concerned that the United
States is spending too much time and energy on security in Asia when the
problems at home seem insurmountable.
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With regard to regional security, the Chinese have repeatedly
stressed the importance of regional peace for the enhancement of economic
development and have repeatedly reiterated their stand on the settlement of
disputes through "peaceful means." As far as China's military expansion is
concerned, China insists that its modernization is designed to meet its own
security needs and not to fill a power vacuum in the region. China has
assured its neighbors that it has no hegemonistic motives, not now or in the
future, and has stressed the importance of stability in the region so that
countries may concentrate on their economic development.
China has gone so far as to give support for the Malaysian proposal
for the establishment of the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) as it would
help promote economic development. China's support for the EAEC should
come as no real surprise as they have repeatedly stated their desire for
continued economic development and regional stability. At least for the
immediate future, the United States has nothing to lose and everything to
gain by supporting China', ambitious economic modernization program.
[Ref. 30]
While dialogue between countries in the region is an excellent place
to start, the number one problem facing those interested in multilateral
security (maritime) arrangements is trust, or lack there of. Because of the
inherent lack of trust in the region, any progress will first have to overcome a
long regional history of ill-will and political baggage. Any multilateral
maritime security plans will have to start out slowly, progressing faster only
after common ground has been met and trusting relationships have been
fostered.
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Who will take the lead in multilateral maritime security dialogue?
It is,'clear that the United States would like to consider itself the centerpiece in
such discussions, but it is also clear that China is not so eager to fall in behind
and follow that lead. Given China's history in dealing with the West this can
be understood, furthermore, China sees itself and the natural regional leader,
the "Middle Kingdom," a concept that far outdates the United States of
America. But it is more reasonable to assume that China primarily wants to
be recognized as one of the leading participants in the shaping of a new world
order. It wants an equal voice with the United States, Japan, Russia or
anybody else in negotiating whatever system or organization may be agreed
upon for future security of the East Asia/Pacific region.
Given the uniqueness of navies, it may be easiest to start collective
security on the oceans. As stated earlier, there are few diplomatic tools as
flexible as naval presence and power projection. The fact that naval forces
play a crucial role in the military balance of the region is not the only reason
for raising the issue of bringing naval matters into the negotiations.
Naval force is becoming an increasingly universal means for combat
operations, not only at sea but also, because of sophisticated deck aircraft
and long-range cruise missiles, on land. Naval mobility and the potential
for buildup of naval forces near the other side's cc, t make naval forces
the most provoking and destabilizing type of armed force. [Ref. 31]
It is for this very reason that I believe a large cooperative naval force
in the region could in fact be very stabilizing as it would help to prevent any
unilateral aggressive action and the smaller, less well armed, nations of the
region could at least feel safer. Here again American presence may be
necessary to keep historical antagonists apart.
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One forum that has received some attention is that of the United
Nations (UN) discussions on creating a standing naval force. Historically
only a handful of UN naval operations have taken place, usually US led and
controlled. Generally speaking, most discussions of prospective UN military
operations have avoided the naval aspect. Recently however, the UN has
published a memorandum identifying nine broad UN naval mission areas
and their supporting tasks. They include: providing for humanitarian
assistance; intervening for humanitarian purposes; interdicting sea and air
traffic; conducting maritime peacekeeping; responding to aggression;
controlling armaments/ conducting demilitarization; enforcing maritime
agreements; making a show of force and; protecting sea and air traffic. The
last three items on this list offer new areas for multir.ational naval
cooperation in a UN context.
If the United Nations is seriously looking to expand its role in
maintaining international peace and security into the maritime arena, it will
have to at least consider China's view. Currently there is no reason to
anticipate a formal military alliance between China and any other nation (the
United States included). The leadership of the PRC values its independence
and flexibility too much to bind itself to the strategic interests of another
country. However, on a smaller less binding scale, cooperation could be
designed to include mutual assistance and coordination on maritime matters
like weather/meteorology, search and rescue operations, and safety at sea
issues.
. For an in depth discussion on the potential role for the United Nations in maritime
affairs see: Jeffrey 1. Sands, "Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United
Nations," (Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia, July 1993).
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2. Challenges and Opportunities
The United States and others concerned are continually monitoring
China's upward trend in military spending which can be seen as a deliberate
campaign by the PLA and Navy to transition its forces into a regional and
eventually global power. The double-digit increases in military spending
since 1990 coupled with efforts to modernize its forces and weaponry paint a
colorful picture of China's firm resolve to become the great military power in
Asia.
China has always seen itself as the natural regional hegemon. Its
sense of historical destiny and its culture, population size, and military
potential all lend weight to this ambition. It is generally believed by Chinese
strategists that China must have a "blue water" navy, not for sailing across
the Pacific but, to project power and protect national interests in the East and
South China Seas.
China has had a long and impressive maritime history, it has been a
major maritime power in the past and aspires to become one again.
Regardless of how multilateral maritime security arrangements develop,
China's naval capacity will effect the strategic balance in Asia.
The next move (regarding China in the larger strategic context) must be
precisely calculated, understood, and coordinated by all the principals.
Regarding the specific issue of China and the sea, the players must ask
themselves, how important is it, and what are the consequences of
China's success or failure in its latest quest for maritime and naval power?
[Ref. 1, p 287]
In the early 1980s, David Muller identified China's next two
national objectives that both hold true for the 1990s and into the 21st century.
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These objectives had then and still have a strong maritime component.
Muller assessed the situatic" as follows,
The first objective, economic modernization and development,
depends upon energy and foreign trade, which directly imply offshore oil,
an exclusive economic zone, and a large merchant marine. These in turn
imply the need for a strong navy. The second objective, the consolidation
of irredentist territories - Taiwan and the South China Sea islands - under
Beijing's rule implies the use or at least the threat of naval force. In the
past, seapower was indeed irrelevant to China's pursuit of its national
objectives. In the future, seapower will be a primary means by which
China will strive to achieve them. [Ref. 2, p 236]
On a larger scale, China's defense modernization cannot be viewed
separately from the sweeping reforms now in progress across the country.
There is good reason to believe that China will achieve its moderate national
defense modernization objectives it the reform is successful and the economy
develops as planned. However, certain external factors could influence the
rate at which defense modernization goes forward, the extent to which it is
carried out, and even its priority status vis-a-vis other national goals, most
decidedly the American factor. With only moderate American engagement,
China will continue efforts to ease international tensions and maintain peace
and stability in the Asian-Pacific area, always with the goal of keeping on
course with its modernization program and its economic development.
Of course no adequate assessment of the implications of Sino-
American military relations is possible without some estimate of their effects
on future Chinese military capabilities. Since US inputs are by no means the
sole determining factor in the Chinese modernization effort, two questions
must be answered.
What is the most likely result of Chinese military modernization
efforts through the end of the century? And, how is the US-China
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military relationship likely to affect that outcome? ... Chinese military
modernization efforts through the end of this century and for some period
beyond are likely to result in only modest improvements to basic military
capabilities. [Ref. 33, pp 97-99]
Some attention must be paid to the possibility of limitation of
armaments, including the navy, in future Chinese-American relations. The
Chinese have their own nuclear and conventional arms-limitation policies
and they all back down to a goal of a "level playing field." There are two ways
to achieve this level playing field. One is to cut down the stronger, and the
other is to build up the weaker. Of course the Americans want to limit the
growth of the power of the Chinese, and the Chinese will insist that any limit
on their own growth will be accepted only as Americans agree to cuts in
American strength. Negotiations on accommodations of the two points of
view will be long and hard, and until satisfactory compromises are reached,
the American naval presence will continue to be the strongest keeper of the
peace in East Asia and the Pacific.
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